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ABSTRACT
I demonstrate that the literature on the racial wage gap has systematically overstated the gains made
by African American men by ignoring their withdrawal from the labor force. Three sources of
selection-bias are identified: imposing sample selection criteria based on labor supply, trimming
wages on the basis of real-dollar cutoffs, and making inferences based on Current Population Survey
(CPS) data whose truncated sampling design excludes the growing incarcerated population. To
recover the counterfactual distribution of skill-prices for non-workers, I implement a quasi-bounds
estimator that does not require the use of arbitrary exclusion restrictions for identification and find
that: (1) Corrected estimates of the racial wage gap indicate a substantial role for the efficacy of the
Civil Rights Act and related initiatives in affecting convergence in segregated states; ignoring
selection causes estimates of convergence in the South as well as the within-cohort component of
this change to be understated. (2) In contrast to the sharp convergence observed in standard wage
series from 1970-90, selectivity corrected estimates indicate complete stagnation over this period
with a divergence of 3.5 to 6 percentage points between 1980 and 1990. Almost half of this
divergence is missed through the exclusion of the incarcerated population. The selective withdrawal
hypothesis can explain 85 percent of the observed convergence between 1970 and 1990 and 40
percent of the 1960-90 convergence. (3) The disproportionate presence of highly skilled blacks in
the armed forces (who are also excluded from CPS analysis) causes estimates of the racial gap to
be overstated by 1 to 2 percentage points. (4) The relative increase in non-participation is a supply-
side effect driven more by a massive increase in reservation wages for blacks at the bottom of the
skill distribution, than by falling offer wages. (5) The significant gains made by black men during
the 1960s and 1970s occured almost exclusively in the bottom offer wage decile, where significant
numbers of black men were pushed out of the lowest white wage decile into higher quintiles. These
gains constitute the primary location of black economic progress in the latter half of the 20th
century.
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amitabh.chandra@dartmouth.eduIn a highly inﬂuential paper, Richard Butler and James Heckman (1977) argued that
expansions in the generosity of transfer programs over the decade of the 1960s had induced
lower-skilled men to withdraw from the labor force. Because African-American men were
more likely to be lower-skilled, observed relative wages would increase. Therefore, a preoc-
cupation with the wages of workers would cause social scientists to overstate the success of
Title VII Legislation, or spuriously conclude that discrimination against blacks had declined.
This hypothesis was used to demonstrate that Richard Freeman’s landmark paper in (1973)
was not consistent with the Civil Rights Act (CRA) raising the relative demand for black
labor: whereas Freeman found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) expenditures on relative wages (at a time when EEOC budgets were small),
Butler and Heckman argued that the selective withdrawal hypothesis could also rationalize
the data.1
At the time of their writing, Butler and Heckman could not have anticipated the phe-
nomenal increase in the returns to skill that would occur in the 1980s; a factor which would
cause withdrawal to the extent that reservation wages were relatively ﬁxed over this period.
Nor could they have predicted the massive growth in the US prison population as a result of
the “war on drugs” and the related Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 which introduced manda-
tory and longer sentencing guidelines for drug-related convictions. Together, these factors
could generate convergence in observed wages since they disproportionately aﬀect low-skilled
blacks. Given that much of what is known on the convergence in the racial wage gap is
b a s e do nas e l e c t e ds a m p l eo fw o r k e r s ,a n de v e nw i t h i nt h a ts a m p l eag r o u pt h a tt y p i c a l l y
meets additional criteria, it is important to understand the magnitude of possible biases that
result from such sample-selection restrictions. Establishing the empirical magnitude of this
hypothesized eﬀect is the primary goal of this paper.2 Additionally, I seek to understand
the degree to which ignoring nonemployment has contaminated the measurement of factors
such as schooling levels, school-quality, and discrimination in aﬀecting the convergence. Fi-
nally, this paper decomposes the extent to which supply shifts vs. demand side forces have
1 It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the enormous literature on the passage of the 1964 CRA and
the related Voting Rights Acts of 1962 and 1965. For an introduction to this subject see the National Research
Council commisioned volume A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society [Jayes and Williams (1989),
Chapter 6], and the rigorous reviews by Brown (1982) and Donohue and Heckman (1991). Brieﬂy, Title VII
of the CRA, which forbade discrimination in employment passed in 1964 and went into eﬀect on July 2, 1965.
Simultaneously, President Johnson’s Executive Order 11246 in 1965 formed the Oﬃce of Federal Contract
Complicance (OFCC), which oversaw anti-discrimination eﬀorts in government contracts.
2 In the spirit of this thesis, Katz and Krueger (1999) study the possibility that the 2.6 percent fall in the
unemployment rate between 1985 and 1998 was a compositional eﬀect that was driven by growing incarceration
rates. Under alternative estimates of what the counterfactual labor force participation rate would be, they
estimate that the true fall in the unemployment rate would have been between 2.1-2.5 percent.
1contributed to the withdrawal of men from the labor-force.
This paper builds on the ﬁndings of a rich literature which has also examined this ques-
tion. In one of the ﬁrst tests of this hypothesis, Charles Brown (1984) adjusted aggregate
Current Population Survey (CPS) data to obtain estimates of the racial wage gap that re-
ﬂected nonemployment. Under the identifying restriction that all nonworkers earn below
what the median agent earns, Brown’s results attribute two-thirds of the observed conver-
gence to the selective withdrawal of blacks from the labor force (the observed gain of 20
percent is only 7 percent when the nonemployed are accounted for). Motivated by the
magnitude of Brown’s results and the availability of detailed microdata, researchers have
attempted to examine the empirical content of this argument in more detail. However, there
is little consensus amongst the results. Of the papers that explicitly mention considering
the possibility of selective withdrawal aﬀecting the observed convergence in wages, Vroman
(1986) uses the CPS-SSA matched data and ﬁnds that the selective withdrawal of blacks
reduces estimates of the convergence by 25 percent; an estimate that is considerably smaller
than Brown’s estimate of 66 percent. The same data are used by Card and Krueger (1993)
and Chay and Honore (1998) who use a sample of individuals who had earnings in multiple
years and could be matched across years.3 Under the assumption that the nonemployed
earn zero dollars, Darity and Myers (1983) provide dramatically larger estimates of the role
of selective withdrawal in inﬂuencing racial convergence in wages. Smith and Welch (1986)
and Welch (1990) use March CPS data and do not ﬁnd support for this hypothesis.4 Blau
and Beller (1992) impute wages for nonparticipants using a regression-matching estimator
combined with a correction factor (to account for the fact that nonworkers diﬀer from work-
ers in unobservable ways), and ﬁnd that the observed gains for younger blacks over the 1970s
are overstated when one accounts for the nonemployed. Using a pointwise matching esti-
mator with CPS data, Juhn (1997) ﬁnds that the selective withdrawal of blacks reduces the
observed convergence by one third over 1968-88. Most recently, Chandra (2000), Johnson,
Kitamura and Neal (2000), and Heckman, Lyons and Todd (2000) provide evidence that is
consistent with the selective withdrawal hypothesis.
Given the enormous signiﬁcance of the selective-withdrawal hypothesis for understanding
3 Vroman (1986) and Card and Krueger (1993) reject the selective withdrawal hypothesis based on analysis
using longitudinal CPS-SSA data. Vroman is criticized by Heckman (1989) for ignoring the fact that marginal
black workers are not covered by social security. Vroman also demonstrates that dropouts who are transfer
recipients have higher earnings than workers; however, his deﬁnition of dropouts includes those individuals
who might have withdrawn because of a pure wealth eﬀect (operating through trans f e r ss u c ha su n e m p l o y m e n t
insurance, or Social Security payments).
4 This is their interpretation of the results and not mine. Because of the importance of their studies, I will
discuss them in more detail in the next section.
2changes in the economic well-being of African Americans, as well as for the eﬃcacy of large
Federal interventions in the labor market, it is surprising to note the degree to which the
existing literature does not oﬀer a consensus estimate of the size, or even existence, of the
putative eﬀect. This paper attempts to reconcile the variance in opinions surrounding em-
pirical studies of the selective withdrawal hypothesis. Its contributions may be summarized
at ﬁve levels:
1. Nonparticipation matters: across the entire skill distribution, prime-age black men have
withdrawn from the labor-force at rates that exceed those for comparably skilled whites.
By 1990, almost 30 percent of blacks were not employed during a random reference week
in the year (versus 6.1 percent for whites) and wages are not observed for 20 percent of
prime age black men (7.3 percent for whites), with annual nonparticipation rates at 40
percent for certain black skill groups. Much of this withdrawal is long-term, implying
that a portion of the views expressed in Smith and Welch (1986) and Welch (1990),
who reject the selective-withdrawal hypothesis by focusing on workers with “marginal”
attachment to the labor-force require reﬁnement. Additionally, sample-selection criteria
based on weeks worked or hours worked also generate convergence in observed wages by
disproportionately excluding low-skill blacks and thereby exacerbating the bias induced
by ignoring nonparticipants. For example, conditioning on Full-Time (FT) and/or a
minimum level of weeks worked results in the racial wage gap “converging” by 3-
5 percentage points between 1980 in 1990; not enforcing such restrictions results in
estimating zero convergence over that period. Similarly, invoking miniscule “trimming”
rules on the basis of real dollar cutoﬀs are shown to compress the racial wage gap and
cause estimates of convergence over the 1960s to be understated, and of estimates over
the 1980s to be overstated.
I demonstrate the importance of not relying on inferences made on the racial wage gap
from data drawn from the CPS, especially after 1980. The CPS has the advantage of
producing a fairly consistent yearly time-series from 1964 onwards; however, it does
not contain information on the institutionalized population. This omission overstates
the convergence over time because it ignores the role of increasing criminal activity
as a response to changing wage structure, as well as the degree to which tougher
sentencing guidelines resulted in more men being incarcerated. Additionally, despite
problems with the undercount, the Census provides a more accurate count of the Not
in Labor Force (NILF) group than does the CPS. In 1990, ignoring the nonemployed
will be shown to understate the racial wage gap by 11-16 percentage points; of this, 4-6
percentage points is the eﬀect of incarceration which would be omitted by the CPS.
2. Wages for nonworkers are imputed using a technique that follows in the spirit of work
by Brown (1984) and exploits later reﬁnements by Neal and Johnson (1996) and John-
son, Kitamura and Neal (2000) in assuming that nonworkers are drawn from points
on the conditional wage oﬀer distribution that lie below that of the median respon-
dent. This method does not rely on the presence of arbitrary exclusion restriction to
identify the counterfactual distribution of wages for nonworkers. Whereas this can also
3b ea c c o m p l i s h e db yi n v o k i n gam a t c h i n ge s t imator and hence assuming “selection on
observables,” the analysis developed here combines the logic of matching estimators
but retains the “selection on unobservables” ﬂavor of traditional corrections for selec-
tion bias. Additionally, this method permits complete non-parametric identiﬁcation of
the standard sample-selection model and a non-parametric method to decompose the
mechanisms of convergence is provided.5
3. Selectivity-corrected estimates of the racial wage gap indicate a substantial role for the
eﬃcacy of the CRA and related initiatives in aﬀecting convergence, even after vintage
eﬀects generated by the retirement of older cohorts are accounted for. Ignoring non-
participation in segregated states causes estimates of convergence in the 1960s to be
understated by as much as 15 percent as a result of excluding a number of nonwork-
ing blacks in 1960 from the analysis. However, in contrast to the sharp convergence
in the observed series from 1970-90, selectivity corrected estimates indicate complete
stagnation over this period with a divergence of 5 percent between 1980 and 1990.
Still pursuing the importance of samples, I ﬁnd support for a theory from the Sociology
literature that there is a role for the Armed Forces in compressing the racial wage gap
[Mare and Winship (1984)]. The military sample is typically excluded from most
analyses of labor markets because the CPS does not collect labor force data on this
sample. This omission would bias empirical estimates of the racial wage gap in a manner
that runs contrary to the selective withdrawal hypothesis— if the military “cream skims”
the most able blacks, then including them in the analysis should raise mean and median
oﬀer wages. While the data support this view, it is not a ﬁrst-order source of bias:
ignoring the armed forces samples overstates the racial wage gap by 1-2 percent.
4. The recent withdrawal of black men across the skill distribution in recent years is a
supply-side eﬀect, driven by a massive relative increase in reservation wages for those
in the lowest quartile of the black oﬀer wage distribution; by 1990 blacks in the lowest
quartile of the oﬀer wage distribution had non-participation rates that were 20 percent
higher than whites in the same quintile, and diﬀerences in oﬀer wages explain 40 percent
of the overall diﬀerence in participation. Over the 1960-90 period, diﬀerences in oﬀer
wages explain a declining portion of the racial gap in employment, and strengthen the
empirical content of models based on blacks having higher relative returns in criminal
activity, disproportionately beneﬁting from expansions in the disability program, or
being in worse health. In 1990, wage elasticities of nonemployment imply that a 10%
increase in oﬀer wages would increase weekly participation by 2.4 percent for prime age
white males who are high-school dropouts, but 3.5 percent for comparable blacks.
5. In the light of the Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) thesis, that economy wide increases
in wage dispersion have contributed to the slowdown in the log wage gap, I study the
5 Donohue and Heckman (1991) and Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996) note the ﬁrst-order impor-
tance of allowing for non-linearities in the wage-schooling relationship and demonstrate that the assumption
of linearity in schooling (as in the Mincerian earnings equation) contaminates inferences in Smith and Welch
(1986, 1989) and Card and Krueger (1992).
4extent to which blacks are positioned in white wage deciles using selectivity corrected
estimates of oﬀer wages. The results indicate that the signiﬁcant gains made by black
men during the 1960s and 1970s occured almost exclusively in the bottom wage decile;
signiﬁcant numbers of black men were pushed out of the lowest white wage decile into
higher quintiles. Virtually no cross-decile convergence occured in the 1980s. Ignoring
selective-withdrawal is demonstrated to paint a diﬀerent economy-wide portrait of the
distribution of African-American gains.
The purpose of this paper is neither to criticize earlier contributions nor to cast stones;
indeed, this paper builds on the pioneering insights of the preceding literature and liberally
borrows from its key ﬁndings. Throughout this paper I study outcomes for prime-age men
(those aged 25-55). The study is focused on men for two reasons: ﬁrst, growing incarcera-
tion and nonemployment disproportionately aﬀects men, and second, the nature of selection
mechanism determining labor force participation diﬀers dramatically for women by race.6
The age-restrictions were chosen to make sure that the results were not contaminated by col-
lege attendance, or at older ages, the growing phenomena of early retirement. The analysis
starts in 1960 because the role of black migration from the south to the north is unimportant
only after 1960 [Donohue and Heckman (1991)].
This paper is outlined as follows: Section I presents a discussion of the facts to be
explained and provides evidence in favor of points (1) and (2) above. In Section II, I review
the identiﬁcation of the standard selection model and discuss the economic content of the
commonly used pointwise matching/regression matching models that have been used to study
the selective withdrawal hypothesis. I develop the bounds estimator used in this paper and
demonstrate how it is nested within conventional selection models. Section III presents
empirical results and Section IV oﬀers a discussion of the potential sources of (relative)
withdrawal. The Data Appendix describes standardizing assumptions that were used in
order to make the census data comparable across diﬀerent years, as well as the computational
details of the bootstrap procedure that is utilized to recover standard-errors.
6 Neal (2002) demonstrates that racial diﬀerences in the participation patterns of women are less likely to
be motivated by diﬀerences in oﬀer wages and posits that race diﬀerences in marriage markets and related
diﬀerences in the shadow price of home production cause many white women with high oﬀer-wages to not be
at work. Including them in the analysis causes the measured wage gap for women to increase from -.18 to
- . 2 5l o gp o i n t si nt h eN L S Y .
51 The Selective Withdrawal Hypothesis
1.1 Racial Diﬀerences in Incarceration and Nonemployment
Using data from the decennial census, Figure 1 describes the key facts that are central
to this analysis by describing the trajectories of Employment/Population (E/P) ratios as
well as relative weekly wages. All census respondents who were at work during the census
reference week (including those who were self-employed or in the armed forces) are counted
as being employed; those who were not in the labor force, unemployed, or institutionalized
are all counted in the denominator. Relative wages are computed using respondents with
incomes from wage and salary who had worked at least one week in the previous year. The
ﬁrst panel in Figure 1 demonstrates that not conditioning on any variables black men had
weekly wages that were 48.1 percent of white men’s wages in 1940. By 1990 this number had
increased to 73.5 percent— a dramatic improvement of well over 50 percent over ﬁve decades,
although the improvement from 1980 to 1990 was essentially nil. Figure 1 also demonstrates
the phenomenal convergence in black-white earnings that occurred over the 1940s. This
convergence is particularly remarkable when one notes that this period precedes the passage
of Brown vs. Board of Education and the major Civil Rights initiatives of the 1960s.7 In
fact, there is evidence that the racial wage gap actually deteriorated slightly over the decade
of the 1950s. It is apparent from this ﬁgure that the E/P ratio for prime-age blacks has
fallen much faster than that for whites.
In the three other panels of Figure 1, I stratify the data by three broadly deﬁned schooling
groups. One point is immediate: inference based on aggregate time-series can be mislead-
ing; when stratiﬁed by schooling levels we see diﬀerent patterns of convergence. The most
“convergence” has taken place for the least skilled, as measured by those with less than a
high-school degree, whereas for those with some college it has remained virtually ﬂat since
1970.8 Because college graduates are also the most likely to be full-time and full year work-
7 Goldin and Margo (1992) label the 1940s as the “Great Compression,” and discuss an extraordinary
decade in American economic history. Their analysis identiﬁes a number of key factors as being responsible
for the convergence in wages across skill groups: period speciﬁc shifts in the structure of labor demand, wage
controls imposed by the National War Labor Board, powerful unions, a rising Federal minimum wage, and
a large supply of educated workers produced by the GI Bill. Margo (1995) builds on these insights in more
detail in the context of the racial wage gap, and concludes that many of these factors also contributed to
the closing of the racial wage gap. In addition, he suggests that Government intervention through Executive
Order 8802 opened up jobs to blacks from which they were previously excluded. Margo also identiﬁes black
migration to the north and the retirement of older black cohorts as contributing factors.
8 It is also possible to use these ﬁg u r e st oc o n t r a s tt h er e s u l t sf r o mc o m p u t i n gE m p l o y m e n t / P o p u l a t i o n
ratios from the Census data to those computed from the CPS (as in the extremely important work of Juhn
6ers, an analysis of the “slowdown” in convergence that focuses primarily on this group would
miss the variation in behavior observed at the extensive margin of employment. These ﬁgures
provide prima facie support for the selective withdrawal hypothesis: in the HS Dropout panel
employment rates for black men are seen to have plummeted relative to those of whites. For
those with more than a high-school degree, the absolute withdrawal has not been as dramatic
although the relative withdrawal is sizable.9
In Table 1, I use Census data to document the degree to which CPS counts of the
nonemployed understate the true statistics because of the sampling frame of the CPS. Table 1,
Panel A displays the fraction of men in the Census reference week who were institutionalized,
and Panel B adds to this fraction by also including those who were unemployed or not in the
labor force (NILF) during the Census reference week.10 Those who are not in the labor force
because of being currently enrolled in school are included in Panel B, but do not contribute
to the deﬁnition of being NILF (they are in the denominator but not in the numerator). The
tables are stratiﬁed by 6 age x 3 schooling cells, and the columns and rows labeled ‘Total’
weight the individual cells by their constituent sample sizes.11 The tables are deliberately
stratiﬁed by age instead of potential-experience as with growing nonemployment over the life-
cycle, the latter measure departs signiﬁcantly from actual-experience. Furthermore, reliance
on experience cohorts, as in Smith and Welch (1986, 1989) and Donohue and Heckman
(1991), will result in pooling diﬀerent birth cohorts— a combination which may be undesirable
(1992)). Between 1970 and 80, in Juhn’s analysis, this ratio falls from ~0.90 to ~0.80 for black dropouts and
from ~.95 to ~0.90 for white dropouts. The use of Census data suggests that this fall was from 0.80 to 0.65
for black dropouts and from 0.85 to 0.80 for white dropouts. As such, Juhn understates the strength of her
central thesis.
9 There is an important caveat to keep in mind in interpreting these ﬁgures: there have been enormous
improvements in the relative quantities of black schooling. For example, the fraction of blacks (whites) with
more than a HS degree grew from 11 (29) percent in 1960 to 40 (56) percent in 1990. Because of this
compositional eﬀect, blacks in 1990 with less than a high-school degree are very diﬀerent from blacks in 1960
who were also high-school dropouts. Composition-adjusted estimates are computed using ﬁxed 1975 weights
and are reported in Table 7.
10 Because of the large sample sizes available in the PUMS data the standard-errors for each of the re-
ported means is extremely small and in the interests of conserving space I have not reported these statistics.
Appendix Table 1A reports the underlying sample sizes. Standard errors for each cell will be given by
SE =
p
b p(1 − b p)/
√
n. Using this formula, it can be noted that typical SE’s ranged from 0.001-0.01.
11 For 1990 the PUMS ﬁles of the Census do not distinguish between the incarcerated and institutionalized
populations. For the purpose of making these tables consistent over time, I have combined the two categories
for previous years and refer to the combined category as the incarcerated population. In 1980 the institution-
alized (non-incarcerated) population was less than 0.2 percent, implying that the choice of this terminology is
not a major source of bias in recent years. In 1960 and 1970 the non-incarcerated institutionalized fractions
were 0.7 and 0.5 respectively. Furthermore, it can be veriﬁed that the institutionalized rates that I report in
Table 1 are virtually identical to incarceration rates calculated in Western and Pettit’s (2000) careful analysis
(compare their Table 3 to my Table 1).
7if improvements in school quality operate at the level of birth cohorts (a point which is noted
in Chay and Honore (1998) and implemented in Card and Krueger (1992)). The results of
these tables are particularly striking. In 1960, 4 percent of all prime age black men were
incarcerated, but by 1990 that number had grown to a little over 6 percent. In examining
incarceration rates for black high-school dropouts a troublesome story emerges. Between 1960
and 1990 the fraction of such men incarcerated grew by well over 200 percent. The increase
in incarceration for the ‘least-skilled’ (those who are aged 25-35 and were also dropouts) is
well over 300%, with almost a doubling of the rate over the decade of the 1980s (25% of this
group were incarcerated in 1990).12
Almost all of the increase in incarceration rates comes from drug-related sentencing and
activity. Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 there were large increases in the propor-
tion of defendants sentenced to prison time, driven largely by the more stringent sentencing
guidelines as well as mandatory jail-time for drug related convictions. Using data from the
Uniform Crime Reports Ih a v ec o n ﬁrmed this fact: adult drug-related arrests (involving
possession, manufacture, sale, or use) rose from 322,300 in 1970 to 471,200 in 1980, and to
1.2 million in 1990. Concomitant to this trend is the fact that the number of drug related
defendants in cases tried in U.S. District courts grew from 7,119 in 1980 to 20,035 in 1990.
Furthermore, a Special Report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (NCJ 171682, June
1999) states that while in 1986 Federal drug oﬀenders could expect to serve a little under
60 percent of the prison sentence imposed (the rest being served on parole), the Sentencing
Reform Act required that at least 87% of the sentence be served via prison time.
From Panel B we see that for many cells in 1990 (both white and black, but dispropor-
tionately black), over 30% of the cells were nonemployed during the census reference week.
For the lowest skilled blacks, these nonemployment rates are seen to be rapidly increasing
over time. By 1990, several cells had nonemployment rates in excess of 50 percent. This
ﬁnding should caution researchers who want to study the racial wage gap using data from
the Outgoing Rotations of the CPS, which collects data based on employment status during
a very short reference period. As Panel B demonstrates, almost 30 percent of all prime-age
blacks would be excluded from any analysis that solicits responses to earnings and labor sup-
12 At the time of writing this paper, the 2000 PUMS ﬁle was still not available. However, using unpublished
data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics I have compared the 1990 numbers to those for the incarcerated
population on June 30th, 2000. Over this time, the overall incarceration rate for black men ages 25-29 climbed
to 13.1 percent from 9.5 percent (an increase of almost 40 percent). The increase for whites is negligible (for
25-29 year olds from 1.3 percent in 1990 to 1.7 percent in 2000). As such, the bias from using the CPS has
continued to grow over time.
8ply questions over a random reference week. The corresponding exclusion for whites would
be 11.5 percent. It is interesting to note two features of the data that are obvious from these
tables. First, much like the well understood age-earnings proﬁles, there are pronounced
age-incarceration and age-nonemployment proﬁles with the ﬁr s tb e i n gf a rm o r ew e l l - d e ﬁned
than the second. Second, the largest increases in nonemployment occurred between 1970 and
1980. However, the rapid growth in incarceration was a phenomenon that occurred over the
1980s.
The results of Table 1 should not be interpreted to mean that the reported fractions of
men who are incarcerated or not at work also represent the fraction without legitimate wage
and salary observations. Those results are reported in Appendix Table A2: Panel A. The
distinction arises because weekly wages in the Census data are computed by dividing annual
earnings last year by weeks worked last year, whereas the results of Table 1 refer to activity
during the reference week of the census this year. Therefore, any respondent who worked
at least one week last year for pay will have a legitimate skill price. However, the extent
to which blacks are missing skill prices (as a consequence of not working even one week in
the previous year) is dramatically higher than for comparable whites. In 1980 and 1990,
skill prices were missing for almost 20 percent of prime-age blacks, but for approximately
7 percent of whites. The probability of annual participation is seen to be an increasing
function of observable skill, suggesting that if a similarly monotone relationship describes
the within-cell relationship between the probability of working and unobservable skill, the
assumption of “selection on observables” would be entirely inappropriate.
1.2 The Role of the Armed Forces
In 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 outlawing discrimination in defense
related industries. This Order also established the Fair Employment Practices Commission
(FEPC), which did not have the authority to prosecute new cases, but relied more on per-
suasion and the threat of presidential intervention. This initiative was followed by President
Truman’s Executive Order 9981 in 1948 which made the Armed Forces institute a policy
of equal opportunity and treatment. Consistent with this liberal view of the Armed Forces
as a nondiscriminatory employer, Table 2 reports participation in the Armed Forces from
1960-90 by education level, age and race (the fraction in the Armed Forces with less than
a high-school degree is not reported as this group is non-existent and any positive counts
tend to be driven by reporting error). The columns and rows labeled ‘Total’ therefore rep-
resent the fraction of Census respondents who reported having at least 12 years of schooling
9and who were also in the Armed Forces. There is a noticeable age-enlistment proﬁle, with
men of younger ages being most likely to be in the Armed Forces. A non-trivial number
of blacks are in the armed forces— with typical rates for younger blacks in the order of 5
percent. Before the passage of the CRA, a signiﬁcant fraction of educated blacks were in
the Armed Forces and there is some evidence to suggest that they withdrew from the armed
forces after the passage of the legislation: almost 10 percent of black men ages 25-29 were in
the Armed Forces in 1960, but the number fell to 5.5 percent by 1970. Mare and Winship
(1984) demonstrate that there was a large increase in the fraction of men of both races aged
20-23 who were enlisted between 1966-72 as a consequence of the Vietnam War. For this
group both races had virtually identical enlistment rates. There was a much smaller increase
for men aged 24-29; in this group black men were more likely be enlisted.
Table 2 also demonstrates that the overall share of prime-age and educated blacks in the
Armed Forces has been declining over time, but is still almost twice the rate for compara-
bly experienced whites. In the sociology literature, Mare and Winship (1984) suggest that
“creaming” such blacks from the civilian labor force may be a contributory factor to observed
employment disparities in the civilian labor market. To the extent that more educated men
also earn more, the decline in the fraction of highly educated blacks after 1960 raises the
possibility that the literature has understated the economic well-being of blacks at least for
the pre-1965 period; a possibility that would cause one to overstate the magnitude of the
eﬀect of Title VII Legislation. The degree to which this bias matters is an empirical question
and will be studied in detail in Section III.
1.3 Revisiting Smith and Welch
This section continues the focus on potential selection bias that is driven by the dispropor-
tionate exclusion of black respondents. In a series of pioneering papers, Smith and Welch
(1986) and Welch (1990) argue that the selective withdrawal hypothesis is not of ﬁrst-order
empirical signiﬁcance. Both papers match respondents to the March CPS in adjacent years
and compare the earnings of workers who worked one year and not the next, or vice-versa,
and do not ﬁnd support for the hypotheses that these marginal workers (exiters) received
lower wages than respondents who worked both years.13 This approach, while ingenious,
13 Smith and Welch (1986) pursue this approach but do not present detailed results. It should be noted
that Welch’s own results (Table 11, p S45) are consistent with the selective withdrawal hypotheses— with the
exception of very young black men and those aged 55-61, both black and white exiters are found to earn less
than stayers. For black men aged 25-34, exiters earned 65 percent of what stayers earned. For those aged
35-54, exiters earned approximately 56 percent of the wage of stayers. However, in interpreting his results
10biases their results because of the sample inclusion criterion that the respondent be success-
fully matched across years: the sample omits persons who were out of the labor force in both
years, moved, or those who worked one year and were incarcerated in another. By construc-
tion, these analyses identify the “marginal” worker and inferences made on such workers are
biased towards zero since there is a growing fraction of men who have not worked in a long
time and are therefore not close to the margin of working. Such men will be excluded from
the analysis as they would have missing wage observations in both years of the match.
In Table 3, Panels A (all ages) and B (age 25-35), I perform a more direct analysis
using a question on the Census which asks the currently nonemployed about when they last
worked. This question was asked starting with the 1960 Census and I have standardized the
responses to this question. I have also excluded individuals who were currently in school
during the Census reference week in order to present a more meaningful picture of the extent
of nonemployment. Notice that at best Welch’s analysis can only capture those respondents
in the top row (those who worked either this year or last) of any panel. This is an upper
bound on the quality of the match since I am ignoring the possibility of not being able to
match respondents who worked one year, but were incarcerated in the next year.14 The other
rows where nonparticipants last worked several years ago are excluded from their analysis
by design. Such selection can be particularly problematic when the number of long-term
nonemployed has been growing steadily over time. In 1980 and 1990, Welch’s analysis would
have excluded over 50% percent of black nonworkers and 40% of white nonworkers.
The underlying trends are troublesome: in 1960 only 3.4 percent of prime aged blacks
who were currently not working, had never worked; by the 1980s and 1990s that percentage
had grown threefold to 10 percent. In addition, a growing fraction of black men are classiﬁed
as being long-term nonparticipants. For example, in 1990 almost 34 percent of black men had
last worked 6 or more years ago. Panel B of Table 3 reports the same tabulation as Panel A
Welch concludes “...relative wages of those who leave the labor force are high enough that the changes in
composition of the remaining workforce cannot conceivably be an important cause of observed increases in
the relative wages of black men (p.55).” Therefore, he does not rule out the selective withdrawal hypothesis
b u tb e l i e v e st h a ti ti so n l ya ni s s u eo f“ ﬁnetuning (p. S44)” the observed convergence. I am grateful to Derek
Neal for suggesting the inclusion of this clariﬁcation.
14 At Jim Smith’s suggestion, I have explored the quality of matching respondents across contingent ‘March’
surveys of the CPS to shed further light on this approach during the decade of the 1990s. The March 1994
and 1995 could not be matched because of conﬁdentiality induced revisions to household identiﬁers. For other
years, a simple match based on HHID, HHNUM and LINENO yielded an average match rate of 71 percent
(of those who were at risk of being matched), but only 57 percent for respondents aged 25-29. When one
conditions further on having a wage observation in one of the years, the fraction falls to 39 percent. This
ﬁnding conﬁrms the extent to which selection-bias could inﬂuence the Smith and Welch ﬁndings.
11but conditions on individuals aged 25-35. Over the 1970s and 1980s young men dramatically
reduced their attachment to the labor force and signiﬁcant fractions became part of the long-
term unemployed; a lesson that reinforces the central message in Juhn (1992). These results
on the growth of the long-term nonemployed will be used later to justify the estimator used
to impute wages for nonparticipants.
1.4 Measuring the Racial Wage Gap: The Sensitivity to Samples
While much intellectual energy has been focused on the role of demand shifts, schooling levels,
and school quality in reducing the racial wage gap, quantifying the relative importance of
these factors depends critically on the overall convergence that is being explained. In Table
4, I report estimates of the sensitivity of the unadjusted observed racial wage gap (meaasured
as the diﬀerence of log wages) to sample selection criertia based on labor supply, but still
ignoring the nonemployed. The purpose of the table is to demonstrate that these criteria can
aﬀect estimates of the gap, its trajectory, and consequently, the facts to be explained. In the
ﬁrst column, I include all workers who worked between 1-52 weeks and note that the racial
wage gap shrinks by 10 percentage points between 1960 and 1970 and again between 1970
and 1980, with no change from 1980 onwards. However, selecting those workers who worked
fulltime (column 2: similar to the work of O’Neil (1990) who requires respondents to work at
least 12 weeks and primarily full-time), or those who worked at least 27 weeks (column 3: as
in Smith and Welch (1989)), results in a measured improvement of 3 percentage points over
the 1980s. Selecting on having worked last year as well as being at work during the census
reference week yields comparable results (column 5).15 The Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1992)
sample (column 4: individuals who worked fulltime as well as at least 39 weeks in the previous
year) result in estimating a convergence of almost 5 percentage points over the 1990s. Sample
restrictions also aﬀect the estimated levels of the racial wage gap— in comparing the levels of
the gap in 1990 across columns there are diﬀerences of 3-6 percentage points in the measured
gap.16 Table 4 also reports the eﬀects of sample restrictions on estimated medians.
15 This restriction was implemented to simulate published tables of earnings by race, such as the U.S.
Census Bureau’s Current Population Reports, Series P-60 which are based on a sample of workers who worked
last year and also during the reference week in March. Similarly, Card and Krueger (1993) require that
respondents be successfully matched across four years of data and have earnings in all four years.
16 Heckman, Lyons and Todd (2000) also note that samples matter for the study of the racial wage gap. In
particular they note that the results in Smith and Welch (1986) and Card and Krueger (1992) are sensitive
to the choice of samples and that diﬀerent samples lead to discordance in even estimating the direction
of convergence in the 1980-90 perriod. HLT also use a sample of workers who worked 1-52 weeks but do
not provide a justiﬁcation for this choice. Bollinger and Chandra (2001) use monte carlo simulations to
12Trimming the data on the basis of real dollar cutoﬀsa l s oa ﬀects estimates of the racial
wage gap and this point is studied in columns 6 and 7 of Table 4. Fixed real dollar cutoﬀsa r e
used in the work of Card and Krueger (1992) who restrict their sample to those respondents
with weekly wages between $35 and $2,591 in 1979 dollars. Similarly, Donohue and Heckman
(1991) require respondents to earn at least $500 per year and between $20-$4000 per week
and $1-$500 per hour. Over time, the oﬀer wage distribution shifts to the right, implying
that the imposition of a 1980 lower bound (be it a dollar cutoﬀ or percentile) will delete a
disproportionate number of African Americans in earlier years. Similarly, the upper bound
will truncate high-wage whites in later years. Together, the two eﬀects will cause estimates of
the racial wage gap to be understated by causing artiﬁcial convergence in wage levels. For the
purpose of illustration, I have reported the results of trimming the data at the 1st and 99th
percentiles of the 1970 and 1980 wage distribution (these cutoﬀs translate into bounds of $77
and $2369 in 1970, and $58 and $2642 in 1980— both reported in 1997 dollars). Estimates of
the racial wage gap are sensitive to both forms of trimming. Comparing the estimates of the
gap from column 1 to those in columns 6 and 7 demonstrates the bounds result in reducing
the estimated gap by 5-6 percentage points. Furthermore, they also reduce the amount of
total wage convergence that occured over the 1960s by 25% (using 1970 bounds) and by 45%
(using 1980 bounds).
The above section documents the sensitivity of the measured racial wage gap to speciﬁc
sample-selection restrictions. When invoked together, the bias can be especially severe. The
recent work of Couch and Daly (2000) on the convergence in the racial wage gap (which
received signiﬁcant news coverage in Business Week, November 29, 1999) can be explained
entirely by sample restrictions, and exempliﬁes the pitfalls associated with ignoring nonpar-
ticipation and simultaneously enforcing drastic sample selection criteria. In this paper, the
authors conclude that the racial wage gap “converged at a rate of 0.59 percentage points
per year between 1990 and 1998. The rate of convergence for younger workers was more
rapid at 1.40 percentage points per year.” These conclusions are an exclusive function of
the sample restrictions imposed in the paper: the authors use CPS data and retain a sample
of respondents who usually worked fulltime and worked at least 39 weeks. In addition, the
earnings data are trimmed at the top and bottom percentiles. Unsurprisingly, each of these
restrictions will disproportionately delete young and low-skilled African Amerian men, and
demonstrate that commonly invoked trimming rules do not ”clean” data and in general tend to attenuate
regression coeﬃcients for known measurement error processes in earnings data. Their analytical results
demonstrate that a lot of information is required to justify the use of a trimming procedure.
13ironically, lead the authors to conclude that the relative improvement in wellbeing for this
group was the most signiﬁcant.
In the light of this analysis, the message is that innocuous sample restrictions designed for
the most part to help the researcher obtain tighter standard-errors or circumvent measure-
ment error bias, also have the unintended consequence of generating ﬁrst-order discrepancies
in the magnitude and even direction of the racial wage gap. While not described in this
paper, the common practice of discarding workers with imputed values for earnings or labor
supply also has this eﬀect since it deletes almost 30% of whites earning over $50,000, as well
as a number of institutionalized respondents (who are disproportionately likely to be black
relative to their population share). Many researchers discard observations for respondents on
the grounds that measurement error in weeks worked or earnings may result in wages that are
too high for such workers. This point is discussed in more detail in the Data Appendix to this
paper and little support is found for the conjecture that respondents with loose attachment
to the labor force have higher wages than observationally equivalent workers. For example,
Appendix Table A3: Panel A demonstrates that a signiﬁcant fraction of respondents had
loose attachment to the labor force (as measured by the fraction working less than 14 weeks
in the year). Discarding them would delete a disproportionate share of low-skill and African
American respondents and therefore cause illusory convergence. However, Table A3: Panel
B demonstrates that there is virtually no economically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the average
weekly wages of the full sample and those who worked more than 14 weeks. This ﬁnding
implies that those who worked less than 14 weeks did indeed earn more than observationally
equivalent respondents and even though measurement error may still compromise the quality
of resulting estimates, the bias from sample-selection will be the more dominant source of
contamination.
This section has identiﬁed four potential sources of bias that have contaminated the
measurement of the racial wage gap: systematically ignoring the nonemployed, ignoring the
Armed Forces samples, implicitly assuming that the short-term nonemployed are comparable
to the long-term nonemployed, and using sample-selection rules that delete large numbers of
low-skilled African American men. The next section develops a framework which allows the
eﬀect of each potential source of bias to be quantiﬁed.
142 Econometric Statement of the Problem
To place the selective-withdrawal hypothesis in an econometrically tractable framework, I
rely on the role of the distribution of equilibrium oﬀer wages as important in measuring
the racial wage gap. Begin by considering the unconditional distribution of oﬀer wages and
assume that an agent works in the formal sector if his (o)ﬀer wage in that sector exceeds
his (r)eservation wage (z =1iﬀ wo >w r;z =0otherwise, and wo =l n ( oﬀer wage)). Using
Smith and Welch’s (1986) insight, one can invoke the law of total probability, and express
the pointwise expectation of latent oﬀer wages E[wo
it|X] for agents from race i in year t and
with covariates X as:
E[wo
it|X]=E[wo
it|X,z =1 ]P r ( z =1 |X)+E[wo
it|X,z =0 ]P r ( z =0 |X) (1)
Here, E(wo
it|X,z =1 )is the (pointwise) mean of observed wages, and E(wo
it|X,z =0 )
is the mean of oﬀer wages to the nonemployed. In other words, it is the average wage oﬀer
that they would be oﬀered if they sought employment.17 Pr(z =1 |X) is the proportion of
workers in the economy. Under the assumption that the relative demand curve is not perfectly
elastic, an analysis of the racial wage gap that ignores the selective-withdrawal thesis suﬀers
from two sources of bias: (a) underestimating Pr(z =0 |X), as would be the case if CPS
data were used instead of Census data, or if trimming rules that disproportionately discard
nonworkers were adopted. Or, (b) underestimating E[wo
it|X,z =0 ] , by assuming selection
on observables when it is inappropriate. With census data, the only quantity not identiﬁed
by the data is E[wo
it|X,z =0 ]in (1). Therefore, the social scientist must make assumptions
about the data generating process which determines this parameter and it is instructive to
review the alternative approaches taken in the literature to recover this quantity:
1. The parametric selection model which allows for “selection on unobservables” is uti-
l i z e di nH o ﬀman and Link (1984). The authors use March 1980 CPS data with ex-
perience, education indicators, veteran status, region indicators, marital status, and
a public/private sector indicator in the wage equation, but substitute age instead of
experience in the participation probit along with omitting employment sector. They
ﬁnd no evidence of the selective withdrawal hypothesis for males aged 21-34, but do so
17 T h e“ e x p e r i m e n t ”h e r ei st oa s kw h a ti st h eo ﬀer wage that each nonemployed agent would get if he chose
to work. Therefore, I am ignoring general equlibrium eﬀects and not asking what the oﬀer wage distribution
would be if all nonemployed agents chose to get wage oﬀers simultaneously. The latter experiment would
shift the entire distribution of wages for workers and nonworkers in complex ways that depend on unknown
elasticities of substitution. Estimating the magnitude of these general equilibrium eﬀe c t si sa ni m p o r t a n t
avenue for future research.
15for those aged 35-55. 18
2. Heckman, Lyons and Todd (2000) (henceforth HLT) use a Taylor-series expansion of
the participation probit to ﬂexibly estimate the control-function in the second stage.
They use of the number of persons under the age of 18 in the household, unearned
income (if available), a home ownership indicator, the interval value of that home, and
state level unemployment and welfare participation rates as exclusion restrictions. It
is unclear how some these variables would be constructed for the incarcerated sample
since the value of one’s home, or family structure, would not be deﬁned for those in
institutionalized group-quarters.19 Furthermore, the diﬃculty of justifying legitimate
exclusion restrictions for prime-age men cautioned me from pursuing this approach.
3. Matching is operationalized in the work of Juhn (1992, 1997), who imputes wages for
non-workers in the CPS (ignoring the incarcerated sample) by conditioning on race,
schooling (four categories) and experience (six ﬁve-year categories) and then assigning
the wages of similar workers to those non-workers. Note that Juhn does not impose a
speciﬁc functional form on the relationship between wages, experience, and schooling—
her approach is entirely nonparametric. This is a great virtue of the matching approach
and will be retained in the estimator proposed in this paper. The degree to which
the researcher conditions on X improves the quality of the match, and it is probably
the case that conditioning on experience and schooling does not adequately address
the degree to which “selection on unobservables” is circumvented.20 Unlike Juhn’s
analysis, identiﬁcation in studies such as Blau and Beller (1992) is implicitly achieved
through the use of regression matching. The assumption of linearity is more restrictive
than allowing a nonparametric relationship between the oﬀer wages and the observable
18 Using PUMS data from 1980 and 1990 I was not able to reconstruct this result, and note that the
magnitude of second-stage coeﬃcients is extremely sensitive to the speciﬁcations used for the participation
probit as well as the wage equation. In particular, the decision to use a quadratic function of age or potential
experience generated very diﬀerent parameter estimates. Furthermore, allowing for nonlinearities in the wage-
schooling relationship as per the results in Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996) prevented the model from
converging. These results are available from the author upon request.
19 I note that the HLT exclusion restrictions generate peculiar wage predictions for nonworkers if the
incarcerated samples are used, and indicator variables are constructed to ﬂag “value of home-missing” or
“persons under 18— missing.” I am grateful to Petra Todd for alerting me to the fact that the constant term
in the second-stage needs to be recovered in such models. I have done so by using the notion of “identiﬁcation
at inﬁnity” as developed by Heckman (1990). I have also experimented with estimating a semi-parametric
model (via a Fourier Flexible Form or semiparametric estimation of the participation equation) using the HLT
exclusion restrictions but my estimates were extremely sensitive to the choice of exclusion restrictions as well
as the choice of semi-parametric correction. Speciﬁcally, small perturbations to the set of HLT restrictions
generated very diﬀerent results.
20 In Juhn’s model nonworkers are matched to workers by an ingenious matching algorithm: Pointwise in
the above covariates each worker is reweighted to stand in for himself and a fraction of nonworkers. This is






j . Part year workers in
group j who worked 14-26 weeks now proxy for themselves, and workers who worked less than 14 weeks, as
well as all nonworkers in group j. In Appendix Table A3 I demonstrate that treating workers who worked
1-13 weeks as nonworkers results in signiﬁcantly reducing the sample of observed wage oﬀers and hence,
will overstating the case for the selective withdrawal hypothesis. Furthermore, from Table A3 it is also not
apparent that the wages of this group are any diﬀerent from other workers in their skill group; in the absense
of more information, measurement error does not appear to be a ﬁrst-order concern for this group.
16characteristics. To allow for the possibility that nonworkers diﬀer from workers along
unobservable dimensions, Blau and Beller experiment with a deﬂation factor, κ such
as 0.6 and 0.8. Note that the amount by which non-workers earn less than comparably
skilled workers is (a) ﬁxed over time, (b) ﬁxed over the entire skill distribution, and (c)
not estimated by the data.
Despite their intuitive appeal and independence from the use arbitrary instruments,
matching estimators should be viewed with caution: recent theoretical and empirical work by
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) (henceforth HIST) ﬁnds that matching estima-
tors perform best when a rich set of conditioning variables are used. In their analysis, which
utilizes experimental data from the JTPA evaluation, matching on crude demographic vari-
ables results in estimates that are severely biased. This ﬁnding has enormous implications for
the willingness of social-scientists to embrace matching as a general solution to solving the
selection bias problem. The cure however, is more diﬃcult to ﬁnd: most research in empirical
social-science is performed on datasets such as the CPS or Decennial Census where the only
covariates available to the researcher are age, years of schooling, census region of residence
and race. The use of NLSY data improves matters by giving the economist access to crude
measures of achievement, as measured by AFQT scores. However, important variables such
as motivation, eﬀort, ambition and tenacity which are ‘observable’ to a potential employer’s
Human Resources Department are unobservable to the econometrician.
2.1 Accounting for Nonemployment using Median Regression
The estimator developed in this paper explicitly recognizes the limitations of the kinds of
data that are presently available for social-science research and is a (pointwise) nonparametric
version of the approach discussed in Neal and Johnson (1996) and Johnson, Kitamura and
Neal (2000). In order to control for the unobserved variables a simple identifying assumption
is made. First, similar to pointwise matching estimators, I place workers and nonworkers in
diﬀerent cells by matching them on the basis of crude observables such as race, cohort, region
and schooling. I then assume that nonworkers will earn less than the median person in that
cell. This assumption is similar in spirit to that used by Brown (1984) but weaker along one
dimension. Brown assumes that non-workers of a given race earn wages that are less than
the median agent in that group’s aggregate wage distribution. In contrast, I assume that
nonworkers of a given race earn less than the median agent conditional on age and schooling.21
Note that I do not need an arbitrary exclusion restriction or reliance on functional form
21 To clarify, consider the following examples: the econometrician must impute wages for (A) a nonworking
30 year old black male with a college degree, and (B) a nonworking 55 year old black male who is a high
school dropout. In Brown’s analysis, both persons are assumed to earn less than the median black worker.
17to achieve identiﬁcation. I do however, have to appeal to the ap r i o r iassumption that
nonworkers have lower unobservables characteristics (operating through lower unobserved
skill, motivation, eﬀort, ambition and tenacity) that cause them to have lower wages than the
median earner in their (pointwise) cell. The assumption underlying this estimator may also be
justiﬁed by recalling the lessons learned in Lynch (1989). Lynch demonstrates that the longer
one is out of work the less likely one is to ﬁnd another job. This eﬀect is shown to be much
stronger for minorities than it is for whites. Given the demonstrated relationship between
experience and earnings it is also safe to conclude that were the long-term unemployed men
to seek employment, their oﬀer wages would be extremely low.
2.1.1 Speciﬁcs
Johnson, Kitamura and Neal use a Mincerian wage equation in their analysis. I will not
impose this restriction and will allow the returns to age and schooling to have discontinuities
at all points in the skill distribution and vary by race. Therefore, for any given skill cell
(which is deﬁned by discrete year x race x education x age categories) we can illustrate
the joint (latent) distribution of reservation wages and oﬀer wages by Figure 2. In this
framework, which is identical to that used in the standard parametric framework, oﬀer wages
are observed for all respondents below the 45 degree line. As drawn, I have assumed that
the upper support of the pointwise distribution of oﬀer-wages is observed. Support for this
assumption is found by exploiting the pattern of between cell variation in oﬀer wages and
participation; Appendix Table A1 notes that in cells with highly skilled workers, annual
participation rates approach 100 percent. Therefore, if the same pattern also persists within
cells (and high wage workers also more likely to work), the upper supports of the oﬀer wage
distribution will be deﬁned. By assuming that log oﬀer wages for nonworkers would lie below
the median cell wage, the median can be recovered. Figure 2 also demonstrates the diﬀerence
between wages for workers and those for nonworkers: E[wo
it|X,z =1 ]considerably overstates
E[wo
it|X,z =0 ]and assuming selection on observables in the absence of high-quality data
will introduce considerable bias in selectivity corrected estimates.
Heckman (2001) discusses evidence conﬁrming that it is appropriate to assume the nor-
mality of the latent log wage distribution implying therefore that log oﬀer wages are normal.
For the purpose of my implemention, I do not require that log-normality necessarily hold—
but I do require that log oﬀer wages are asymmetric and log normality is a suﬃcient condition
for symmetry. Deﬁne the true (pointwise) median of the latent log oﬀer-wage distribution
In contrast, I assume that if A were to work, he would earn less than the median person in the distribution
of wages for 30 year old black males with a college degree. Similarly, B is assumed to have an oﬀer wage that
is less than the median earner in the distribution of wages for all 55 year olds who are high-school dropouts.
18as:
Υ50,X = F−1
X (0.50) = inf{x : FX(w) ≥ 0.50} (2)
where the X subscripts explicitly refer to the fact that we are conditioning on available
covariates.22 The pointwise racial wage gap is measured as GAPX = E(ln wo|X,Black =
1) − E(ln wo|X,Black =0 )and the aggregate gap requires integration over the supports
of the X0s. Under log-normality of the oﬀer wage distribution, we are assured that the
mean and median are equivalent, implying that GAPX = Med(ln wo|X,Black =1 ) −
Med(ln wo|X,Black =0 )or equivalently, GAPX = ln(Med wo|X,Black =1 )− ln(Med
wo|X,Black =0 ) .23
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the method of assigning all nonworkers to below the median
can result in a “classiﬁcation error” where some non-workers who would actually earn more
than the median are incorrectly assigned to have oﬀer wages below the median. Of course,
there will be no classiﬁcation error if the distribution of reservation wages is a deterministic
or constant function of the skill covariates (an assumption that is often made in search
models)— in this case, all nonworkers are correctly predicted to earn less then the pointwise
median respondent. Johnson, Kitamura and Neal (2000) explore this issue in more detail
using NLSY data. In particular, for current nonworkers they search the data forward and
backward for a wage observation to see if it is above or below the predicted median. Their
results (see their Figure 1: Panel B) may be summarized as follows: in 1992 wage data
were missing for 8 percent of their sample (in contrast to 8.8 percent for in my data: see
Appendix Table A2). For the men for whom wages were imputed, 15% had wages reported
22 The corresponding sample quantity is analogously deﬁned by using b Υ50,n = F
−1
n (0.50) = inf{x : Fn(w) ≥
0.50}, where the empirical distribution function is deﬁned by Fn = n
−1 Pn
i−1 I{Wi6w}. This deﬁnition guar-
antees that the sample percentiles are well deﬁned under discontinuities and nonmonotonicity of Fn.
23 It is possible to nest this framework within the classical models of “index-suﬃciency.” In the HIST
framework, the latent distribution of log oﬀe rw a g e si sg i v e nb y :w
o







k and vk is independent of Γ2(R) and R is [X : E],w h e r eR includes variables that comprise
an exclusion restriction (E). Therefore, we observe oﬀer wages if I
∗ > 0 and do not otherwise. Hence,
Pr(z =1 |R)=Fv(Γ2(R)), implying that Γ2(R)=F
−1
v (Pr(z =1 |X)). In this class of models index suﬃciency
states that: E[²|X,Γ2(R),z =1 ]− E[²|X,Γ2(R),z =0 ]=0 . If index suﬃciency holds, we can recover the
wages for workers and nonworkers by using:
E[w|X,z =1 ] = Γ1(X)+E[²|v>−Γ2(R)]
E[w|X,z =0 ] = Γ1(X)+E[²|v<−Γ2(R)]
Under log-normality of the oﬀer wage distribution Γ1(X)=Υ50,X. Therefore, all the parameters of
the above equation can be identiﬁed (while allowing the workers to diﬀer from nonworkers in unobservable
ways without the use of an exclusion restriction). It permits quasi-nonparametric identiﬁcation in that the
functional relationship between oﬀer wages and observable characteristics is not speciﬁed and the joint density
between oﬀer wages and reservation wages is not fully parametrized although the covariance is restricted to
be between 0 and 1.
19in another year that always exceeded the predicted wage; the 15% error rate falls to 10%
when one only considers the non-disabled group but this is a self-reported measure of health.
As such, the error in prediction is small. Note that the 15% error rate is observed for current
workers who were not at work in 1991 but worked in either 1990-91 or 1993-94; Therefore,
it is possible to reduce the magnitude of classiﬁcation errors by assuming that the logic of
assigning nonworkers to earn less than the pointwise median only applies if one has been out
of the labor force for three or more years. To understand the magnitude of the classiﬁcation
error problem in the more realistic case where both oﬀer wages and reservation wages have
a bivariate distribution, I experiment with three alternative assignment rules:
1. Median-O: Assume that respondents who do not have a wage observation (those who
worked 0 weeks last year) have equal probabilities of having oﬀer wages above and
below the pointwise median. This method assumes “selection on observables” in that
non-workers have a distribution of oﬀer wages that is identical to that of workers
once observable dimensions of skill are controlled for. This estimator will be labeled
Median-O, where the ‘O’ refers to the fact that it is identical to recovering the pointwise
observed median.
2. Median-NJ: Assume that all respondents who do not have a wage observation (those
who worked 0 weeks last year) have a zero probability of having oﬀer wages above the
pointwise median. This implementation follows in the spirit of the Neal-Johnson esti-
mator and will be labeled Median-NJ.I td i ﬀers slightly in that all respondents who are
NILF but in school are assumed to have oﬀer wages above the median. Appendix Table
A2: Panel A reports the exact fraction of men in each cell for whom this assumption
was made. In 1990 for example, 20% of black men did not have oﬀer wages— all these
men were placed below their respective pointwise medians.
3. Median: Assume that respondents who do not have a wage observation (those who
worked 0 weeks last year) and who have not worked in three years have a zero proba-
bility of having oﬀer wages above the pointwise median. Therefore, if a respondent did
not work last year but worked this year, or if they last worked even two years ago they
would be assumed to have equal probabilities of having oﬀer wages above and below
the pointwise median. Respondents who are NILF but in school are assumed to have
oﬀer wages above the median. This method is less stringent than Median-NJ and is
labeled Median. Appendix Table A2: Panel B reports the exact fraction of men in each
cell for whom this assumption was made. In 1990 for example, even though wages are
missing for 20% of black men, only 12.7 percent of them were assigned wages using the
median imputation rule.
By construction, Median-O >Median >Median-NJ. However, the “true” estimates of the
racial wage gap will lie between those estimated by Median-NJ which assigns all nonworkers
without wages to lie below the median and those estimated by Median since Median may be
considered to be a realistic upper bound for a variety of reasons. First, only the very long
term nonemployed are assigned to generate oﬀer wages below the pointwise median with this
20estimator. Second, recall that Johnson, Kitamura and Neal detected prediction violations
for only 15% of the sample of nonworkers who had loose attachment to the labor force. I am
being especially conservative by placing 50% of workers with loose labor market attachment
over the pointwise median and by using an expanded deﬁnition of what constitutes “loose
attachment.”24 Finally, Welch (1990) demonstrates that the short-term unemployed (those
who worked in the census year or preceeding year) are closer to their employed or enrolled
in-school counterparts, than they are to the long-term unemployed or NILF group in terms
of their propensities to be married—spouse present, living with a parent or other relative,
or living alone. They are however much more likely to be unmarried or married-spouse
absent, or be living with their parents than those who are employed (even within narrowly
deﬁned age categories). Despite these facts the Median estimator treats these short-term
unemployed respondents, as well as those who worked even two years ago, as being identical
to those who worked. For these reasons, results from the Median estimator may be thought
of as representing conservative estimates of the selective withdrawal hypothesis.
3R e s u l t s
3.1 Selectivity Corrected Estimates
Table 5 presents the key empirical results. Following the results of Table 4, anyone who
worked at least one week last year for wage and salary is treated as a worker. I present ob-
served means (column 1) as well as observed medians (column 2). These were computed by
taking the pointwise mean (or median) of the 4 year x 2 race x 3 education x 6 age category =
144 cells that saturate the data, and then integrating over the supports of these cells. Several
features of this table are noteworthy: First, as Panel A demonstrates, the observed mean
and median tell a similar story in terms of wage convergence— by 1990 the racial wage gap
w a s- . 3 5l o gp o i n t s .T ot h ee x t e n tt h a td i ﬀerences in log oﬀer wages approximate percentage
diﬀerences, both matching (column 3) and median-O (column 4) lower that estimate by a
little less than 2 percentage points (since matching computes means, the corrected results
from matching should be compared to the observed means in column 1, whereas the results
from median based corrections should be compared to the observed median in column 2).
These results are unsurprising— both corrections simply reweight the data over the distribu-
24 Several readers of this paper have recommended experimenting with placing only 15% of nonworkers above
the median as per the results of Kitamura, Neal and Johnson (2000). The logic of randomly assigning 15%
of respondents without wages to lie above the median does not follow directly from the results in Kitamura,
Neal and Johnson (2000). More information is needed to perform such an an assignment since the rate of
violations may vary across cells and assuming that it is orthogonal to measured skill is an assumption that
goes beyond their results.
21tion of the covariates using the full-sample instead of being restricted to the distribution of
covariates for workers. They do not allow non-workers to diﬀer from workers in unobservable
ways. In columns (5) and (6) I implement median estimators that allow for selection on
unobservables of the type discussed in the preceding section. The estimated wage gaps from
using the Median-NJ estimator are larger than those obtained using Median; this is to be
expected since Median-NJ places all non-workers below the pointwise median whereas Me-
dian only does it for the long-term unemployed. Given that the true answer lies in between
these two estimators, it is reassuring that their diﬀerence is small for most of the sample
period. The diﬀerence of 6 percentage points in 1990 reﬂects growth in the number of work-
ers with transitional attachment to the labor force over the the1980s. The results obtained
from Median convey a very diﬀerent picture of black economic progress than those obtained
by only looking at the observed series. Whereas the observed median (computed using all
respondents who worked at least one week in the previous year) reports a convergence of
8.5 percentage points between 1960 and 1970, a further convergence of 8 percentage points
during the 1970s and stagnation during the 1980s, accounting for the nonemployed results
in a convergence of 10 percentage points over the 1960s, 4 percentage points over the 1970s
and a divergence of over 3 percentage points in the 1980s. Note that these are conservative
estimates for what the “observed data” report— in the light of typically invoked sample inclu-
sion criteria reported in Table 4, most observed series would have reported convergence over
the decade of the 1980s. The estimates from Median demonstrate that selection accounts
for 38 percent of the 1960-90 convergence (the measured convergence of 0.16 log points is
reduced to 0.10 log points when selection is accounted for) and 86 percent of the 1970-90
convergence.25
Table 5 also reports estimates of the racial wage gap by excluding two groups: in Panel
B the institutionalized sample during the census reference week is excluded, and in Panel
C all respondents in the armed forces during the census reference week are deleted. These
exclusions were imposed to give other researchers a sense of the bias that results if CPS
data are used to study the racial wage gap. The exclusion of the institutionalized sample
causes the level of the racial wage gap to be understated by 4-5 percentage points in 1990
25 I have also replicated the analysis by saturating the data with ﬁve education categories (< 9y r so f
schooling, 9-11 yrs, 12, 13-15 yrs, and 16+ yrs) instead of three education categories. The results are virtually
identical to those obtained in above. For example, the Median corrected estimates reported in Panel A:
Column 6 changed to -0.562 in 1960, -0.460 in 1970, -0.421 in 1980 and -0.464 in 1990. I have refrained
from pursuing this classiﬁcation in the paper because it unclear whether reported schooling of less than 9
yrs in 1980 and 1990 is correct or dominated by measurement error. Furthermore, if the data are saturated
further (for example, by allowing for respondents with 0-4 years of schooling to be in their own cell), annual
nonparticipation rates exceed 50% and nullify the applicability of the Median based corrections for selection.
22and the bias grows over time (comparing results in Panel A columns 5 and 6 to those in the
same columns in Panel B). It can also be seen that the divergence reported in columns 5
and 6 of Panel A over the decade of the 1990s is approximately halved if the incarcerated
are excluded (more precisely Median-NJ removes 60% and Median removes 40% when this
sample is excluded). Panel C reports that the role of the Armed Forces in compressing the
racial wage is small— the exclusion of respondents in the armed-forces causes the level of the
racial wage gap to rise by about 1.5-2.0 percentage points in 1980 and 1990. The rate of
convergence is not estimated to be statistically diﬀerent from that obtained from Panel A for
the 1960s and 1990s, although ignoring the Armed Forces does cause estimates of convergence
in the 1970s to be understated by 20-35 percent. This understatement of the convergence
is driven by relatively large numbers of young black men who enlisted in the Armed Forces
during the Vietnam War. Overall however, while there is certainly support for the Mare and
Winship contention that omitting the Armed Forces sample causes estimates of the gap to
be overstated, the bias is not of a ﬁrst-order nature.
In a series of important papers, Heckman and Paynor (1989) and Donohue and Heckman
(1991) demonstrate that the thrust of Federal intervention occurred in the South, a thesis
that suggests that we should see larger convergence in southern states during the decade of
the 1960s. Panel D restricts the analysis to southern states. It can be seen that the 1960
gap in the South was 0.13 log points higher than that in the whole country. In comparing
column (6) to column (2) we see that the observed gap shrank by 9.5 percentage points
over the 1960s. However, accounting for the non-employed raises the convergence to 11
percentage points over this period— a result that is identically estimated by Median and
Median-NJ. This happens because incorporating the nonemployed into the analysis magniﬁes
estimates of the log wage gap in both 1960 and 1970, but by relatively more in 1960, thereby
causing an understatement of overall convergence. This ﬁnding runs contrary to the original
Butler-Heckman thesis: the data are consistent with a view that ignoring the nonemployment
causes the analyst to overstate convergence in 1970, but this bias is greater in 1960— therefore
causing the actual convergence to be understated by 14 percent (1.5 percentage points of 11
percentage points) in the South. Adjusting for selection also reduces estimates of wage
convergence during the 1970s in previously segregated states: the observed convergence of
0.155 log points is reduced to 0.10-0.12 points in the selectivity corrected estimated. By 1980
most of the North-South diﬀerence in the race gap had been removed; by 1990 the levels of
the gap across regions were virtually identical.
233.2 How Reasonable are these Estimates?
In Table 6, I report the underlying point estimates to better understand the strength of the
identiﬁcation assumptions used in this paper and to determine whether the underlying ‘true’
wages as determined by the alternative estimators are plausible. To focus the discussion
I limit the analysis to 1980 and 1990 because it is in those years that nonparticipation
becomes a central issue. For each year and by each race x education x age cell, I report
three statistics for hourly wages: the observed mean, the reported median and the corrected
median (as computed by the Median estimator). Hourly wages were computed by dividing
weekly wages by the average number of hours worked by workers in that cell. I have focused
on hourly wages because counterfactual hourly wages can be readily compared to known
bounds for hourly wages such as the minimum wage. The point estimates reported by the
Median estimator are within sensible bounds. For example, even in the cell with the highest
nonparticipation rate (blacks aged 25-24 with less than a HS degree in 1990), wages are
estimated to be $4.9/ hour (in 1997 dollars). In 1989 the value of the minimum wage was
$3.35 (in current dollars) and $4.30 in 1997 dollars. Therefore, these estimates do meet
basic logical tests for consistency— they are considerably above the minimum wage. For some
cells with young workers with more than a HS degree, the selectivity-corrected estimates are
greater than the observed median. This occurs because of the presence of large numbers
of respondents who do not have skill prices but are currently enrolled in school. Since this
group is predicted to earn over the median respondents wage, in cells where there are more
respondents enrolled in school than the long-term nonemployed, the corrected estimates will
be larger than the observed series. As Table 6 demonstrates, such corrections are observed
for young blacks aged 25-35 with more than a high-school degree in 1980 and 1990, and for
comparably skilled whites in 1980 and 1990 (although the diﬀerence is only economically and
statistically signiﬁcant for whites in 1990).
Another feature of the data to note from Table 6 is that the distribution of observed log
wages is negatively skewed— the median exceeds the mean. Ideally, in the absence of selection,
the log wage (oﬀer) distribution would have equivalent mean and median but the fact that
the observed median exceeds the observed mean implies that mass has been removed from
the left tail of the distribution, thereby giving it a negative skew.26 In a model where latent
26 Mean wages are probably overstated for cells with low participation rates and cells where large numbers
of respondents worked few weeks (this is because earnings will be divided by a very small number of weeks).
Furthermore Bollinger (1998), who studies the nature of measurement error in the CPS, demonstrates that
low-earning workers tend to overstate their earnings. If this is true, the gap between reported mean and
median wages should expand as one moves up the skill distribution, and Table 9 conﬁrms that this is indeed
true.
24wages are log-normally distributed this will only happen if the selection is coming from the
left tail of the pointwise distribution of oﬀer wages. This empirical observation supports the
logic of assigning nonworkers a wage below that of the median agent.
3.3 Schooling, School Quality and Discrimination
The results reported in the above section do not adjust for the fact that, at a point in time,
as well as over time, whites and blacks have diﬀerent levels of schooling and experience.
Observers of the racial wage gap might want to decompose the sources of black economic
progress into their constituent components— schooling levels, school quality and the role of
discrimination. In particular, the results of Table 5 are driven by diﬀerences between whites
and blacks in observable skill (“between skill diﬀerences”), and diﬀerences in unobserved skill
as well as the possible contribution of discrimination (“within skill diﬀerences”). To study
the contribution of these factors it is instructive to consider a non-parametric decomposition
method. For those respondents with wages, we may write the observed racial (log) wage gap
between blacks and whites as ΓObs = E(wbt|z =1 )− E(wwt|z =1 )in year t. This gap may
in turn be expressed as:
ΓObs =
Z
E(wbt|X,z =1 ) f(Xbt|z =1 ) dX +
Z
E(wwt|X,z =1 ) f(Xwt|z =1 ) dX
=
Z









This is a non-parametric version of the familiar Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Its virtue
is that there is ipso facto no problem with overlapping supports since the skill cells are
constructed separately by race but using the same age x schooling combinations. Therefore,
unlike the conventional decomposition where “counterfactual” wages of blacks are typically
estimated by extrapolating into a region of no support, the nonparametric method does
not suﬀer from this limitation. In the above equation, the “within” diﬀerence (or residual
diﬀerence) is weighted by the white distribution of skill for workers but since this weighting is
arbitrary Table 6 reports estimates with contemporaneous white and black weights separately.
When non-workers are accounted for, the above decomposition changes on two counts.
First, the observed within-skill gap is now measured by the diﬀerence in the average oﬀer
wages for blacks and whites. Second, this gap will now be weighted by the white (or black)
25distribution of skill for all workers f(Xit), instead of f(Xit|z =1 ) .The selectivity corrected












Results from the above decompositions are reported in Table 6, which reports the “residual”
diﬀerence in the racial wage gap. The observed series are weighted using equation (3) whereas
the corrected series reﬂect equation (4). The table therefore answers the following question:
if whites (blacks) had the same observable characteristics as blacks (whites) what would the
trajectory of the racial wage gap be? To the extent that policy makers are interested in
answering questions like “what would the size of the racial wage gap be if blacks had white
characteristics?” interest should be focused on tables with white weights. Estimates of the
residual gap obtained using the Medianand Median-NJ estimators indicate that the residual
gap comprised almost 80 percent of the observed gap in 1960. By 1970 this component of
the gap had fallen to 73 percent and has marginally declined to 70 percent since then. This
ﬁnding is consistent with an interpretation where decreases in discrimination or improvements
i ns c h o o l - q u a l i t yc a u s e da ni m p r o v e m e n ti nb l ack economic well being over the 1960s, but
where improvements in either of these factors essentially ceased after 1970. Ignoring selection
results in the residual gap comprising a much larger portion of the measured gap (75 percent
in 1970 and later). When black weights are used the explained portion declines. This ﬁnding
implies that the residual gap is larger in skill-cells in which blacks are concentrated (those
with relatively lower education and experience), and therefore that the returns to schooling
are actually higher for blacks than whites, and that the residual gap is a decreasing function
of schooling levels.
The above decomposition is useful in explaining the magnitude of the racial wage gap at
a point in time. To understand the trajectory of the residual gap over time, consider changes
in the decomposition reported above: if ∆Xt represents the diﬀerence in X0s at time t,t h e
26total change Γt − Γt0 may be written as:
Γt − Γt0 =
Z




Change in Explained Diﬀerence
=
Z
[E(wbt0 − wwt0|X) − E(wbt − wwt|X)]f(Xwt0)dX
| {z }
+
Change in Unexplained Diﬀerence because of Changes in Relative Returns
Z
[f(Xwt0) − f(Xwt)]E(wbt0 − wwt0|X)]dX
| {z }
Change in Unexplained Diﬀerence because of Changes in White Covariates
(5)
The ﬁrst two terms of the above decomposition deﬁne the portion of convergence that is
attributable to improvements in the observable characteristics for both whites and blacks as
well as within-cell improvements for whites, E(wbt0 − wbt|X). The last two terms measure
the contribution of changes in the residual gap and may be isolated by examining the panels
of Table 7 that are weighted by contemporaneous weights. If the eﬀects of school-quality
manifest themselves by changing the returns to schooling then we must isolate the middle
term in the above decomposition (this is the mechanism by which school-quality aﬀects wage
improvements in Smith and Welch (1986) and Card and Krueger (1992)).27 Therefore, it
is necessary to compute the above decomposition with ﬁxed-weights (a ﬁxed distribution for
f(Xit0) over time would set ∆Xt =0 ). In this paper I have used two sets of ﬁxed-weights:
the white distribution of skill in 1975 (computed by averaging the 1970 and 1980 distribution
of skill) and the analogous black distribution of skill from 1975. The use of these weights
will primarily aﬀect point estimates of the racial wage gap in 1960 and 1990 since they are
furthest away from the reference year. Results from ﬁxed-weight analysis are also reported
in Table 6. Estimates of convergence using ﬁxed-weights are virtually identical to those
obtained from the imposition of contemporaneous weights, implying that improvements in
the relative levels of skill to changes in the residual gap (the last term in the decomposition
above) do not contribute substantially to convergence in the racial wage gap.
The central insights of the numerous estimates reported in Tables 5 and 6 are graphically
summarized in Figure 3 and the ﬁgure provides separate panels for all states and southern
states. The ﬁgure demonstrates the diﬀerence between the observed and corrected (as com-
puted by Median and Median-NJ) series. To keep the graph tractable, I have graphed the
contribution of changes in relative returns (the race-year interaction term from the above
27 This term is the non-parametric analog to the “race-year interaction” in the work of Smith and Welch
(1986, Tables A.3-A.6) and Donohue and Heckman (1991, p.1620). Its nonparametric structure also allows
for improvements in school-quality to operate through the intercepts of a conventional wage equation as in
Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996).
27decomposition), but only as computed by the Median estimator. It is immediate from this
ﬁgure that during the 1960-70 period the full amount of convergence from the Median esti-
mator can be explained by the race-interaction term implying that convergence in the levels
of skill does not contribute to convergence over this period— across all states “within cell” im-
provements account for 93% of the true convergence and 98% of convergence in the South. If
this ﬁnding is interpreted in the light of Donohue and Heckman’s contention that the timing
of the school quality hypothesis is not suﬃciently aligned to explain the 1960-70 convergence,
the reduction in the within-skill gap may be interpreted as a decline in discrimination over
this period. This interpretation will be studied in more detail in the next section through
a within cohort analysis. During the 1970-80 period the race year term explains 28% of the
convergence in all states, implying that over 70% is attributable to convergence in relative
skill levels and aggregate changes in the economy. However, in the South the contribution
of this term continues to be substantial— almost 80% of the convergence over the 1970s is
attributable to this term. Whereas this is less true in southern states where the share of the
race-year interaction explains over 75% of the selectivity corrected estimates from Median,
it is clear that there was also convergence in skill levels that contributed to the overall con-
vergence. Over the 1980-90 period the observed series shows a divergence in the racial wage
gap— a trend that is considerably magniﬁed in the corrected series. Once again, the race-
year interaction explains over 90% of the decline, although it can be seen that convergence
in relative skill levels continued. Had this convergence not occured, the divergence in the
racial wage gap in the 1980s would have been greater by 11 percent. As such, these results
reinforce the central message of Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991).
3.4 Cohort Level Analysis
To disentangle the role of improving school quality from that of declining discrimination in
aﬀecting wage convergence, Table 7 reports both within and between cohort estimates of the
racial wage gap, and reports results for observed medians, corrected medians and corrected
medians using contemporaneous white weights. I deﬁne a cohort as a group of individuals
born in a three year window centered on the year labeled ‘Birth Year.’ In each year of the
Census the racial wage gap may be computed for a number of cohorts. Because the focus on
black economic progress during the 1960s centers on the South, I ﬁrst emphasize the results
in Table 7: Panel B. As can be clearly seen from the columns labeled ”Corrected-Median”
a substantial portion of the progress between 1960 and 1970 as well as from 1970 to 1980 is
indeed driven by vintage eﬀects (the replacement of retiring older cohorts with newer ones)—
it can be clearly seen that the wage gap for older cohorts is much greater than the corre-
28sponding measure for entering cohorts. However, it is also apparent that substantial within
cohort compression in the racial wage gap occured for almost all cohorts during the 1960s;
a feature that cannot be generated by improvements in school-quality (which would tend to
beneﬁt only younger cohorts), but is more readily explained by reductions in discrimination.
Table 7 also reports the portion of convergence between year t and year t − 1 that may be
attributed to within cohort improvements in the racial wage gap. This is the portion of the
convergence in percentage points that can be explained using changes for continuing cohorts
using the decomposition in Card and Krueger (1992) wherein within cohort improvements
are weighted by base year weights.28 The results demonstrate that ignoring nonparticipa-
tion results in understating the role of within cohort convergence over the decade of major
civil rights initiatives. For example, the total observed convergence between 1960 and 1970 in
southern states was 8 percent, of which 2.4 percentage points is attributable to within cohort
improvements (implying that 30 percent of the measured convergence in within cohort). In
the selectivity corrected estimates, the corrected convergence is 0.11 log points and the within
cohort component comprises over 50 percent (5.8/11) of this improvement. Negative values
for the within cohort component occur because of the disproportionate location of blacks in
the lower portion of the skill distribution— a group whose wages in real terms between 1980
and 1990 [Katz and Autor (2000)].
This analysis may also be used to shed light on the racial wage across cohorts. Returning
to Panel A of Table 7, we see that ignoring nonparticipation causes a dramatic understate-
ment of the racial wage gap for younger cohorts. In 1990 for example, cohorts who had just
turned 25 saw a gap of a little less than 0.40 log points; the observed series on the other
hand estimates the gap to be just under 0.30 log for this group. Blacks born in 1965 were
the ﬁrst cohorts to be born in fully integrated hospitals (as a result of Title VI legislation)
and constitute the leading edge of cohorts that attended desegregated schools in the south.29
Interestingly, even though correcting for selection dramatically raises estimates of the racial
wage gap by almost 30 percent for this cohort, it is also clear that the oﬀer wage gap for
this cohort is almost 10 percentage points smaller in magnitude than that of the preceeding
28 In Card and Krueger’s (1992) framework, the overall gap in a given year can be expressed as the
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weight for cohort j in year t. The “within cohort” component of the change in the gap would therefore be








t ). This is the within cohort number that is reported in Table 8.
29 It was only after the Supreme Court’s passage of Green v. Board of Education of New Kent County
and Alexander v. Holmes County in 1968 and 1969 respectively that southern states began the process of
desegregation. On the eve of the passage of these rulings, only 22 percent of blacks were in desegregated
schools. However, the increase from almost 0 percent to 22 percent occured between 1963 and 1967 implying
that cohorts born at that time would have been amongst the ﬁrst to be educated in fully integrated schools.
29cohort. This improvement persists even when observable dimensions of skill between whites
and blacks are accounted for; a point that can be seen in the last panel of Table 7 where
contemporaneous white weights are imposed on the data. While this analysis does not es-
tablish causality, it does provide suggestive evidence that cohorts born at the time of the
Civil Rights initiatives appear to be much better oﬀ than their predecessors. Pursuing this
line of inquiry with longer panels would likely be a fruitful area for new research. Table 7
also demonstrates that black cohorts born in Southern states between 1945 and 1955 real-
ized signiﬁcant gains in relative wages relative to earlier cohorts. For example, in Southern
states, the relative wage gap for entering cohorts in 1970 is dramatically lower than that for
entering cohorts in 1960. Similarly, in 1980, entering cohorts (who were born in 1950-55)
had a relative wage gap of 0.31 log points vis-a-vis a gap of approximately 0.47 log points
for cohorts that entered in 1970. Discrete improvements in relative wages of this nature are
consistent with school quality improvements in the South, and are consistent with the ﬁnd-
ings of Donohue, Heckman and Todd (2002) who demonstrate that between the late 1930s to
1960, black schooling quality improved relative to whites. As such, for cohorts born between
1935-1960 should see convergence in relative wages.
4 Discussion: What explains the Withdrawal?
4.1 Diﬀerences in Oﬀer Wages
One class of explanations attempts to reconcile the diﬀerences in participation by appealing
to demand side factors such as declining oﬀer wages for the least skilled. Stated diﬀerently,
how much of the employment diﬀerential may be explained by diﬀerences in oﬀer wages
between blacks and whites? To answer this question, I follow the pioneering framework
of Juhn (1992) and denote the aggregate participation rate for race i ∈ {black,white}as
Pit(Wi
t). This function measures the probability of a respondent working during the census
reference week as a function of his oﬀer wage. The diﬀerence in participation between whites
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The ﬁrst term measures the predicted component of diﬀerences in participation that are
a function of measurable diﬀerences in oﬀer wages; actual white participation rates at each
wage Pw
t (Ww
t ) are subtracted from the counterfactual white participation rate (computed
by assigning the black distribution of oﬀer wages to whites). The second term is the residual
component and measures the racial gap in participation that is attributable to race diﬀerences
in participation at the same wage (here, the black wage). This term assesses the role of the
30entire participation schedule shifting, and is evaluated at a common oﬀer wage distribution.
Therefore, racial diﬀerences in willingness to participate in the disability program, the returns
to crime, or other “tastes” driven by changes in social-pathologies such disenfranchisement
from the formal labor market would all shift the participation function diﬀerentially by race.
Ic a ne s t i m a t epit(w) with b pit(w) by examining participation rates at diﬀerent points on the
support of the oﬀer wage distribution fit(w). In other words, by using the estimated oﬀer
wage distribution, we can compute the empirical counterpart to pit(w) by calculating the
cumulative participation rate at each value of the oﬀer wage.
Juhn uses the results from her matching estimator to estimate fit(w). Even if selection on
observables is appropriate, this method only yields b w = Xβ, not the distribution of Xβ +²;
the variance of fit(w) is still unknown. However, it is possible to overcome this problem by
exploiting the information contained in the assumption that the latent distribution of oﬀer
wages is log normal. To see this, note that it is always true that: var(w|X)=E(w2|X) −
[E(w|X)]2,where var(w|X) refers to the variance of conditional oﬀer wages. Corrections for
sample-selection bias yield consistent estimates of E(w|X). To obtain an estimate of the ﬁrst
term I note that E(w2|X)=E(w2|X,w > w)Pr(w>w|X)+E(w2|X,w < w)Pr(w<w|X).
If it is indeed the case that log oﬀer wages are normally distributed (and therefore symmetric),
then it is also the case that E(w2|X,w > w)=E(w2|X,w < w). We may compute the
variance by calculating E(w2|X,w > w) for those observations with (observed) oﬀer wages
above the corrected median. Once var(w|X) is estimated, we can assign each non-worker an
arbitrary “error” with a draw from a normal distrib u t i o nw i t hm e a nE(w|X) and variance
var(w|X). Note that this method allows for the variance of residual skill to vary by race and
skill, and more importantly over time.
Figure 4 describes the results of this analysis. For each year of the data I compute an
estimate of the black oﬀer wage distribution (using the Median estimator and adjusting for
the variance using the method described above) and compute black and white participation
rates at each decile of the black oﬀer wage distribution. The ﬁgure graphs the racial diﬀerence
in participation at each decile of this distribution. Therefore, over time, the black oﬀer wage
distribution is allowed to change, but white participation is always evaluated at black oﬀer
wages. Figure 4 demonstrates a massive increase in reservation wages for blacks in the
bottom deciles of the black oﬀer wage distribution between 1970 and 1980; in the bottom
two deciles the racial gap in participation averages 20 percent.30 During the 1960s, this gap
30 I was concerned that even within deciles blacks may be earning less that whites. While there is some
evidence for this claim, it is not substantive. This can be seen in the ﬁr s tp a n e lo fT a b l e9w h e r ew i t h i nd e c i l e
the racial gap in wages is essentially zero. The larger discrepency in the top decile of the black distribution is
to be expected— almost all college-educated white men would be assigned to that black decile. Using the data
31was around 5 percent and black participation actually exceeded white partcipation rates in
the middle of the black oﬀer wage distribution. Over the median black oﬀer wage, diﬀerences
in participation rates have remained relatively stable since 1960. Table 9 presents the actual
data by wage percentile of the black oﬀer wage distribution and reports the actual racial gap
in wages at each percentile of the black distribution (ideally, this diﬀerence would be zero
or close to it), as well as participation rates at each decile by race. At the bottom of Table
9 I report the results of the decomposition discussed above. In 1960, over 80 percent of the
racial diﬀerence in participation was attributable to diﬀerences in oﬀer wages, whereas by
1990 that fraction had fallen to 40 percent. The declining explanatory power of the oﬀer-wage
model demonstrates the importance of searching for supply-side explanations in explaining
the decline in black labor force participation in the last quarter of the 20th century.31
4.2 Black Economic Progress in an Era of Increasing Wage Dispersion
This analysis can also be used to shed light on the precise location of economic gains made
by African-American men in the economy wide distribution of skill. In the light of the
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) thesis, that economy wide increases in wage dispersion
have contributed to the slowdown in the log wage gap, I study the extent to which blacks
are positioned in white wage deciles using selectivity corrected estimates of oﬀer wages.
Figure 5 reports the fraction of African-American men in each decile of the white oﬀer wage
distribution. If blacks and whites had the same oﬀer wage distribution, there would be 10
percent of blacks in each white oﬀer wage decile. It is important to note that Figure 5 diﬀers
from Figure 4 in that the white distribution of oﬀer wages is plotted on the x-axis of Figure
5. The advantage of this approach is that it allows me to abstract from changes in industrial
stucture, and having to predict industry and occupation for nonworkers. Its limitation is that
it treats oﬀe rw a g e sa sas u ﬃcient statistic for tracking changes in labor market well-being.
The results indicate that the signiﬁcant gains made by black men during the 1960s and 1970s
occured almost exclusively in the bottom wage decile; signiﬁcant numbers of black men were
pushed out of the lowest white wage decile into higher quintiles. Concurrently, there was a
substantial increase in the proportion of black men in the fourth and ﬁfth deciles of the white
reported in Table 9 it is also possible to recompute Figure 4 by assigning blacks in decile i their participation
rate in decile i +1 ,a na s s i g n m e n tt h a tipso facto gurantees that black participation is being evaluated at an
oﬀer wage higher than that for whites. The results of this recalculation yield results that are qualitatively
similar to those in Figure 4.
31 Aaronson (2002) notes that models which allow the current work decision to be a function of forward-
looking predictions of the returns to experience have considerably more predictive power than those which
are “myopic”. To the extent that the returns to experience have fallen more at the bottom of the oﬀer wage
distribution and, furthermore, more for blacks than whites within deciles, her ﬁndings (even though they
abstract from race) provide an extremely important angle for future research to investigate.
32oﬀer wage distribution during the 1960s, and an increase in the fraction of the sixth through
ninth deciles during the 1970s. These ﬁndings support an interpretation of the eﬀects of the
CRA and related initiatives whereby the economic prospects of the least-skilled blacks were
most aﬀected, with much smaller eﬀects on the economic well-being of more skilled workers.
Since the gains during the 1960s and 1970s are not uniformly distributed, this ﬁnding also
emphasizes the need to appreciate the heterogenous impacts of Federal interventions in labor
markets. In the 1980s, cross-decile movement essentially ceased; there was a slight decrease
in the fraction of black men the second decile, and a corresponding minor increase in the third
through ﬁfth deciles. When the same ﬁgure is generated using wages for only workers, the
fraction of black men in the bottom two deciles is understated by almost 5 percentage points
with an accompanying overstatement of the fraction in higher wage deciles. Furthermore,
the striking reduction in the fraction of black men occupying the bottom wage decile of the
white oﬀer wage distribution is severely understated.
4.3 The Disability Program
The leading supply-side explanation comes from t h er o l eo ft h eD i s a b i l i t yI n s u r a n c eP r o g r a m ,
and constitutes the primary suspect in the original Butler-Heckman paper. As this section
demonstrates, the DI program cannot explain the withdrawal during the 1960s, but it may
be the most attractive explanation for recent years. For the purpose of historical accuracy it
should be noted that Federal Government labor economists ﬁrst noted the connection between
disability beneﬁts and labor force withdrawal, but failed to suggest a connection with this
withdrawal and the putative success of Title VII Legislation. As early as 1972, Gastwirth
(1972) attributed more than 90 percent of the decline in the labor force participation of
prime aged men (aged 25-55) between 1956 and 1968 to three factors: (a) the expansion of
disability beneﬁts to men under the age of 50 (50 percent of the 90 percent), (b) increases
in the number of full-time graduate students (10 percent) and (c) changes in the 1967 CPS
deﬁnition of employed and unemployed (30 percent). Building on this work, Siskind (1975)
notes that the last inference does not appear to be entirely correct. Siskind in turn provides
detailed disability takeup rates by age and race which support the disability-beneﬁts induced
explanation for declining labor force participation. Figure 6 studies the relationship between
Labor Force Participation (LFP) and disability beneﬁts takeup rates. The data used to
produce this graph are from the 1974 Manpower Report of the President, as presented in
Siskind (1975). The ﬁrst panel of graphs report LFP rates by race and age. The second
panel reports the corresponding percentage of men who were receiving disability beneﬁts at
t h ee n do ft h ey e a r .B e c a u s et h eC R At o o ke ﬀect on July 2, 1965, I have highlighted that year
33to emphasize any before-after treatment eﬀects, or the presence of “run-up” eﬀects. Several
features of these trends are worth noting. First, for all three age groups under consideration,
there were declining trends in LFP that had begun well before the passage of the CRA. These
declines began before 1955; before anyone could have anticipated the passage of the Great
Society’s programs. Second, the relative declines are greatest for those men aged 45-54 and
do not appear for younger men. Furthermore, an examination of the second panel shows
that the largest increases in the percent of men on disability have occurred for those aged
45-54.While there were large expansions in the fraction of younger men receiving disability
beneﬁts, the increase in recipiency is not large enough to explain the corresponding declines
in LFP. Therefore, while there is certainly evidence to support the central contention of the
Butler-Heckman hypothesis, and that of Heckman (1989), that the LFP rates of black men
declined faster than that of white men, there does not appear to be any prima facie evidence
that supports the theory that the growth in the disability program caused these relative
declines through 1975.
In contrast to the above results, Autor and Duggan (2001) demonstrate that the rela-
tionship between DI and participation is much stronger in the 1980s and 1990s: in 1984, 30
percent of high school dropout males who were nonparticipants were receiving DI or SSI.
By 1999, the fraction had risen to 47%. Amongst those aged 25-64 the fraction of nonpar-
ticipants on disability grew from 45 percent to 57 percent. This growth is a function of
both falling skill prices (which raises beneﬁt replacement levels and aﬀects the incentives
to enter unemployment), as well as of changes in the generosity of the disability program.
Their research, though it abstracts from race, is in the spirit of the original Butler-Heckman
hypothesis and suggests that the DI program based link that Butler-Heckman posited for
the 1960s may actually have been more empirically relevant for the 1980s. Amongst the
least-skilled, the growing generosity of the DI program appears to hold signiﬁcant explana-
tory power. Researching the possible connection between race, health, and the DI program
remains an exciting avenue for future research.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Ever since Myrdal published his monumental treatise, An American Dilemma, in 1944,
considerable intellectual energy has been devoted to studying the causes and dynamics of
the racial wage gap. However, much of the literature constituting this debate has relied on
inferences made on CPS data and therefore has ignored the growing nonparticipation problem
amongst blacks that is driven by increases in incarceration rates and labor supply responses to
falling skill-prices. The purpose of this paper has been to revisit a thesis ﬁrst propounded by
34Butler and Heckman almost 25 years ago, and to evaluate whether a signiﬁcant portion of the
observed convergence in black-white earnings may be explained by the selective withdrawal of
low-skilled blacks from the labor force. Despite the importance of this topic and the amount
of intellectual energy devoted to studying black economic progress, the US. Commission on
Civil Rights has remained suspicious of the possible magnitude of the selective withdrawal
hypothesis:
“Empirical research suggests, that this potential bias, under most plausible assump-
tions, would not account for a large share of the growth in the relative earnings of black
males.” [United States Commission on Civil Rights (1986)]
This paper aggressively challenges the above view, and demonstrates that the selective
withdrawal hypothesis can explain 85 percent of the observed convergence between 1970 and
1990, and 40 percent of the 1960-90 convergence. Interestingly, it refutes the original Butler-
Heckman contention that Freeman (1973) had overstated the case for the CRA and related
initiatives. In southern states I ﬁnd evidence for having understated the convergence over
the 1960s however the massive increase in nonparticipation and incarceration since 1980 have
caused observed series to be dramatically overstated. These corrections have two messages
for researchers— ﬁrst, that the simultaneous modelling of wages and participation is central
to any analysis of the racial wage gap, and second, innocuous sample selection criteria can be
the cause of enormous bias— even the direction of convergence will be incorrectly estimated
through the inclusion of only a select sample of workers.
One explanation for the decline in partcipation is that anti-discrimination eﬀorts weak-
ened signiﬁcantly over the 1980s. This is the view espoused in Bound and Freeman (1992,
p.229) who argue that “ﬁrms no longer facing an aﬃrmative action gun” were under no
compulsion to maintain the gains achieved in the late 1960s. This appealing argument is
not entirely consistent with the historical record for it is not the case that the eﬃcacy of the
CRA was correlated with measured anti-discriminatory budgets. The persuasive evidence
presented in Brown (1982) and Donohue and Heckman (1991) demonstrates that the greatest
gains in the racial wage gap were achieved during a period of weak EEOC budgets. It is how-
ever, important to note one interesting fact: Bound and Freeman cite evidence showing that
federal contractors who were covered by mandatory aﬃrmative action plans did not reduce
the share of black males that they employed. By itself, this fact is not supportive of their the-
sis but remains an extremely important avenue for future research: in a general-equilibrium
model of labor markets with multiple sectors, successful enforcement in one sector will de-
press relative wages in another by diverting white labor from the covered to the uncovered
sector. However in the light of Figures 4 and 5, to the extent that blacks in the lowest deciles
35of the oﬀer wage distribution are disproportionately hurt by reduced enforcement eﬀorts, the
Bound-Freeman ﬁnding deserves more attention, as does the broader topic of heterogenous
treatment-eﬀects from Civil Rights enforcement eﬀorts on the economy-wide distribution of
oﬀer wages.
The corrected trends documented in this paper oﬀer bleak predictions for future trends in
the racial wage gap, especially amongst younger and lesser-skilled groups. By 1990, almost
30 percent of blacks were not employed during a random reference week in the year (versus
6.1 percent for whites) and wages are not observed for 20 percent of prime age black men (7.3
percent for whites), with annual nonparticipation rates at 40 percent for certain black skill
groups. Much of this withdrawal is long-term. One source of “progres” that may generate
the illusion of convergence in the coming years is the legalization of abortion following Row
vs. Wade in 1973. Gruber, Levine and Staiger (1999) demonstrate that the marginal child
aﬀected by this ruling would have had a 40-60 percent greater chance of living in a single-
parent family, dying as an infant, or growing up in poverty and welfare. Cohorts aﬀected by
the legalization of abortion would be entering the labor market at the time of the 2000 census.
T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tb l a c kc h i l d r e na r ed i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l ym o r el i k e l yt ob et h em a r g i n a lc h i l d ,
the legalization of abortion provides avenues by which ‘convergence’ could manifest itself. In
the spirit of Donohue and Levitt (2000) who demonstrate that legalized abortion accounts
for almost 50 percent of the drop in crime in the 1990s, incarceration rates should start to
fall for younger black cohorts in a manner that mirrors the declines in crime. The magnitude
of this eﬀect is unknown but will serve to reduce the bias associated with the use of CPS
data to study the racial wage gap. Therefore, it is possible that rapid convergence in wages
and employment may be observed in skill-cells where the marginal child is most likely to
have been located. These eﬀects should give social-scientists and policy-makers little reason
to be sanguine, for the convergence would have remained inherently illusory.
366D a t a A p p e n d i x
The data used in this paper are derived from the PUMS ﬁles of the US. Decennial Census
1960-90. For 1960 there is only one public use ﬁle. In 1970 I use the State 15% sample, and in
1980 and 1990 I use the entire “B” sample. In 1960 and 1970, the Census did not ask respon-
dents for the number of hours worked, or the number of weeks worked. Instead, respondents
were asked to report their answers to a bracketed version of the question. Buchinsky (1994)
provides a method to convert bracketed “weeks worked last year” responses to a continu-
ous measure and I follow his algorithm. As an alternative, I have also experimented with
assigning the mean and the median value of the bracketed interval as the true value of the
variable. Based on a validation study that I conducted using the 1980 and 1990 Census,
Buchinsky’s method was preferred in terms of generating estimates that were closer to the
reported values for these years.
Because of the well-known problems with the Census “hot-deck” allocation procedures
I was cautious about the use of respondents with imputed data. In unpublished work I
have dropped all records with imputed values for either age, gender, race, schooling, hours
worked, weeks worked last year, or wage and salary income. However, in this analysis I have
retained respondents with imputed data for two reasons: First, the number and quality of
imputation ﬂags changes over time and second, large numbers of African American men are
deleted if the imputed samples are deleted. Throughout this paper I deﬁne “black” and
“white” as respondents who identiﬁed themselves as being black or white, but were not of
Hispanic ancestry. Wage and salary data are deﬂated to constant 1997 dollars using the
chain-weighted Implicit GDP Price Deﬂator.
In 1980 and 1990 those individuals who claimed to have fewer than 8 years of schooling
and were younger than 35 years of age have been combined with other high-school dropouts.32
In examining the characteristics of this group of individuals I noted that they had high rates
of being NILF and incarcerated (in fact over 50 percent of blacks aged 25-30 in 1990 with
fewer than nine years of schooling had no weekly wages). For those with weekly wages, these
were lower than those of all other skill groups (but had larger variance). My results are
impervious to dropping this group completely from the sample or simply combining them
with other high-school dropouts. However, “within-cell” estimates for dropouts aged less
than 35 are sensitive to this restriction. Appendix Table 1A describes the ﬁnal sample sizes
used for analysis in this paper. In 1960, it is not possible to directly estimate the fraction
of respondents who last worked two years ago (that is, in 1958). To recover this quantity, I
divided the fraction of respondents who last worked between 1955 and 1958 by four.
6.1 Measuring Skill Prices
The Census asks questions on total income from wage and salary last year, weeks worked last
year, and hours worked last week. I exclude those workers with self-employed income from
the construction of skill prices, because observed skill prices for the self-employed also reﬂect
a return to capital. I have replicated the analysis presented in Table 5 with the self-employed
samples and ﬁnd that the results are always within the 95 percent conﬁdence-interval of the
full-sample estimates reported in Table 5: Panel A. To construct a measure of skill price I
32 I am grateful to Derek Neal for this suggestion. However, I alone am responsible for any errors in
adopting this approach.
37use two alternative measures. In the ﬁrst, weekly wages are deﬁned by total wage and salary
income divided by weeks worked last year. By ignoring the number of hours worked last
week the social-scientist is implicitly assuming that conditional on working a certain number
of weeks there is no variation across workers in the number of hours worked. My second
measure divides weekly wages by hours worked last week (or a particular reference week in
the 1940 Census). This measure loosely corresponds to “skill-price” in conventional models
of labor demand. The obvious problem with this measure is that the product of weeks worked
last year and hours worked last week is only a proxy for total hours worked last year. In
1980 and 1990, the Census also asked respondents for “usual hours worked last year.” In
these years, the correlation coeﬃcient between the two measures of hours worked was 0.65.
Whereas many labor economists would prefer the use of the latter measure of hours worked,
it is not necessarily superior to the former. Conditional on only knowing the total number
of weeks worked last year, and not the joint distribution of weeks worked and hours worked
in each week, what is needed is an estimate of average hours worked. This may or may not
correspond to the usual hours worked question. First, respondents may not recall the average
number of hours worked last year and may incorrectly report it. Secondly, they may interpret
the question literally and report the modal number of hours worked across all weeks worked
last year. Therefore, it is possible that the response to hours worked last week is actually
a superior measure of hours worked than usual hours worked last year. Weekly wages are
the object of interest in Card and Krueger (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991) and for
much of the analysis in Katz and Autor (2000). Despite its theoretical limitations, the use
of weekly wages provides the cleanest proxy for skill prices.
In order to discard observations that are considered to be “gross errors,” I depart from
the literature and do not trim my samples based on being above or below an arbitrary cutoﬀ
as speciﬁed by an upper and lower bound on real skill prices. This approach, while popular,
ignores the fact that over time economic growth will shift the distribution of wages to the
right. Therefore, deleting observations that make over $100 an hour (in 1997 dollars), or less
than one half of the 1982 value of the minimum wage, over the entire 1940-90 period will
result in dropping very diﬀerent groups of people over time. I winsorize the data at 1-percent
and 99-percent. These bounds are allowed to vary by year. This procedure was pursued in
the light of analytical and simulation results in Bollinger and Chandra(2001).33
6.2 Imputation of Weekly Wages for Armed Forces Samples
In using the Armed Forces sample, a possible source of bias may be introduced if the analyst
uses their weekly earnings as an estimate of their skill-price in the conventional wage and
salary market. The source of this potential bias is the fact that a large portion of the
compensation for members of the Armed Forces may come in the form of “in kind” transfers
such as food and housing allowances. In 1991 for example, these allowances totaled 19
percent of cash compensation. To examine this possibility I compared (pointwise) diﬀerences
in average weekly wage with and without the armed forces sample to see if the latter group
33 Bollinger and Chandra demonstrate that trimming the data is a desirable procedure only for very special
measurement-error processes which are not found for the data generating process describing wages or earnings.
They demonstrate that attenuation bias is introduced if the analyst trims the data when in fact a conventional
measurement error process is at work. They demonstrate that the process of winsorizing or doing nothing
appears to be most desirable strategy to adopt in working with wage data.
38were earning signiﬁcantly less than observationally equivalent wage and salary workers. There
is considerable evidence for this theory, although the results do vary over time and by skill
category. Whites currently in the Armed Forces tend to earn 12-15% less than comparably
skilled whites; for blacks, the opposite result generally holds true. Since joining the Armed
Forces may be a response to the civilian labor market that civilians face, I did not want
to impute wages based on the eﬀect of veteran status on earnings. Instead, I use the work
of Asch and Hosek (1999) and noted that conditional on age and education, total military
compensation is at the 78th percentile of civilian pay for junior enlisted personnel (E4s at
Y O S4 )a n da tt h e7 0 t hp e r c e n t i l eo fc i v i l i a np a yf o rm i d - c a r e e ro ﬃcers (O4 at YOS 12).
I have therefore assigned all military personnel to lie above their pointwise median. For
matching estimators, the wages of the Armed Forces sample are recoded upwards to the
pointwise mean if they are less than that mean.
6.3 Standard Errors
Throughout this paper, standard-errors were computed using bootstrap replications for all
estimates. The details are as follows: First the data were resampled 200 times (with replace-
ment) by race and year. This resulted in 4 (year) x 2 (race) x 200 = 1600 datasets. Next,
the ﬁrst dataset for blacks in 1960 was merged with the ﬁrst dataset for whites in 1960, and
then merged with the ﬁrst dataset for blacks in 1970 and then whites in 1970, until there
were a total of 200 datasets each with sample sizes given in Appendix Table A1. To ensure
replicability, point estimates reported in the paper are the actual results from the PUMS data
and not the sample average across the 200 samples. However, to obtain standard-errors for
the reported estimates the programs used in this paper were estimated on the 200 datasets
and the standard-deviation of the answers was saved to a separate ﬁle. This method, while
tedious, allows the standard-errors to account for the sampling distribution of the covariates
in addition to the sampling distribution of the point estimates.
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Figure 1: Black-White Relative Wages and Employment Population Ratios, for Men aged 25-55  
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Author’s calculations from the PUMS data. No sample restrictions have been placed on the data for the construction of 
employment/population ratios. Relative wages were computed by using weekly wages for wage and salary workers who worked 
at least one week in the previous year. 
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Figure 3: Observed and Corrected Estimates of the Racial Wage Gap with Fraction Explained by Race-
Year Component 
 
Observed series refer to observed medians, corrections refer to those obtained from the Median  estimator 
(see Section 2.1 of text for details). Race x Year Interaction is the component of the change that can be 
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Figure reports White-Black difference in participation rates during the census reference week at each 
decile of the black offer wage distribution. The black offer wage distribution was computed using 

































































The white offer wage distribution was computed using the Median estimator described in the text 
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Table 1: Fraction of Prime Age Men who are Institutionalized, or Unemployed, NILF and Institutionalized during the Census Reference Week 
 
  Panel A: Fraction Institutionalized  Panel B: Fraction Institutionalized, Unemployed, NILF 
  Whites Blacks  Whites  Blacks 
  < HS HS HS+ Total < HS HS HS+ Total < HS HS HS+ Total < HS HS HS+ Total
1960         
25-29  0.021 0.005 0.002 0.010 0.068 0.025 0.016 0.053 0.118 0.054 0.039 0.072 0.219 0.138 0.083 0.187
30-34  0.017 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.058 0.036 0.025 0.050 0.103 0.045 0.030 0.065 0.208 0.154 0.093 0.186
35-39  0.017 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.050 0.036 0.027 0.045 0.110 0.046 0.031 0.069 0.204 0.132 0.103 0.183
40-44  0.016 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.038 0.028 0.015 0.035 0.112 0.051 0.037 0.078 0.197 0.147 0.098 0.183
45-49  0.014 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.027 0.021 0.033 0.026 0.118 0.062 0.050 0.092 0.200 0.155 0.110 0.190
50-54  0.015 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.028 0.017 0.014 0.026 0.150 0.090 0.074 0.126 0.225 0.140 0.120 0.213
                
Total  0.016 0.006 0.004 0.011 0.044 0.029 0.022 0.040 0.121 0.055 0.041 0.083 0.209 0.143 0.098 0.190
                      
1970       
25-29  0.023 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.079 0.028 0.014 0.048 0.141 0.066 0.050 0.076 0.253 0.142 0.105 0.185
30-34  0.019 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.051 0.028 0.007 0.037 0.121 0.055 0.039 0.067 0.203 0.136 0.086 0.164
35-39  0.014 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.044 0.021 0.008 0.033 0.116 0.052 0.040 0.068 0.195 0.123 0.086 0.160
40-44  0.013 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.035 0.016 0.010 0.028 0.113 0.058 0.048 0.076 0.210 0.137 0.088 0.180
45-49  0.013 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.026 0.021 0.026 0.025 0.133 0.071 0.057 0.092 0.215 0.160 0.105 0.195
50-54  0.012 0.006 0.003 0.008 0.020 0.026 0.010 0.020 0.160 0.091 0.069 0.118 0.252 0.163 0.110 0.229
                
Total  0.015 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.040 0.024 0.012 0.032 0.133 0.066 0.050 0.084 0.222 0.141 0.096 0.185
       
1980       
25-29  0.035 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.101 0.039 0.026 0.050 0.264 0.128 0.067 0.112 0.452 0.265 0.161 0.278
30-34  0.027 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.071 0.035 0.022 0.040 0.236 0.110 0.056 0.095 0.345 0.234 0.138 0.230
35-39  0.019 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.041 0.026 0.017 0.029 0.210 0.094 0.048 0.092 0.326 0.215 0.135 0.232
40-44  0.013 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.025 0.016 0.010 0.018 0.206 0.093 0.052 0.100 0.286 0.202 0.129 0.222
45-49  0.009 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.016 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.210 0.107 0.060 0.117 0.333 0.201 0.138 0.257
50-54  0.008 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.014 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.249 0.142 0.087 0.161 0.356 0.251 0.180 0.306
                
Total  0.016 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.043 0.027 0.019 0.031 0.231 0.113 0.061 0.112 0.352 0.234 0.147 0.255
       
1990       
25-29  0.042 0.015 0.007 0.013 0.231 0.077 0.052 0.095 0.288 0.130 0.062 0.108 0.619 0.318 0.182 0.320
30-34  0.044 0.013 0.006 0.012 0.162 0.065 0.043 0.072 0.283 0.122 0.057 0.100 0.506 0.320 0.174 0.290
35-39  0.035 0.012 0.006 0.010 0.110 0.049 0.044 0.058 0.286 0.129 0.061 0.099 0.490 0.286 0.177 0.274
40-44  0.031 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.070 0.043 0.036 0.046 0.282 0.134 0.068 0.104 0.391 0.275 0.178 0.257
45-49  0.021 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.067 0.026 0.027 0.039 0.275 0.129 0.076 0.118 0.403 0.250 0.176 0.270
50-54  0.013 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.034 0.024 0.016 0.025 0.299 0.159 0.104 0.157 0.374 0.266 0.163 0.276
                
Total  0.030 0.011 0.005 0.010 0.114 0.054 0.040 0.061 0.286 0.133 0.068 0.112 0.466 0.294 0.176 0.285
 
Source: Authors tabulations from the PUMS data for 1960-1990 (1990 data have been weighted using person weights). No sample restrictions have been placed on the data. See Data 
Appendix for details of PUMS sample. NILF stands for Not in the Labor Force, but does not include respondents who were enrolled in school.  
Table 2: Fraction of Prime Age Men in the Armed Forces during the Census Reference Week 
 
 
Whites  Blacks 
  HS HS+ Total HS HS+ Total
1960          
25-29  0.067 0.050 0.059 0.103 0.087 0.098
30-34  0.049 0.026 0.038 0.059 0.046 0.054
35-39  0.041 0.032 0.037 0.041 0.025 0.035
40-44  0.028 0.040 0.033 0.012 0.030 0.019
45-49  0.012 0.018 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.014
50-54  0.006 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.005 0.008
Total  0.037 0.031 0.034 0.052 0.041 0.048
    
1970  
25-29  0.037 0.052 0.044 0.057 0.052 0.055
30-34  0.043 0.031 0.037 0.059 0.049 0.056
35-39  0.047 0.033 0.040 0.074 0.046 0.064
40-44  0.019 0.019 0.019 0.037 0.031 0.035
45-49  0.008 0.015 0.011 0.018 0.012 0.016
50-54  0.004 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.008
Total  0.027 0.029 0.028 0.049 0.038 0.045
    
1980  
25-29  0.033 0.023 0.027 0.059 0.044 0.052
30-34  0.029 0.024 0.026 0.041 0.030 0.035
35-39  0.022 0.025 0.024 0.038 0.049 0.042
40-44  0.012 0.021 0.017 0.025 0.033 0.028
45-49  0.004 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.011
50-54  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005
Total  0.019 0.020 0.020 0.037 0.034 0.036
    
1990  
25-29  0.028 0.037 0.033 0.046 0.061 0.053
30-34  0.015 0.027 0.023 0.028 0.054 0.041
35-39  0.012 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.039 0.030
40-44  0.006 0.016 0.013 0.004 0.022 0.014
45-49  0.003 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.013 0.008
50-54  0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.003
Total  0.013 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.039 0.031
 
Source: Authors tabulations from the PUMS data 1990 (1990 data have been 
weighted using person weights). See Data Appendix for details of sample. 




Panel A: Last Worked- Age 25-54     
 1960 1970 1980  1990 
Whites  
This yr/Last yr 69.0 67.1 64.1  60.6 
2-5 yrs ago 12.4 15.3 14.3  16.2 
6+ yrs ago 14.2 12.4 16.3  17.6 
Never Worked  4.4 5.2 5.3  5.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
  
Blacks  
This yr/Last yr 63.1 58.4 49.3  48.0 
2-5 yrs ago 15.6 17.2 15.4  18.4 
6+ yrs ago 17.9 17.2 26.5  23.8 
Never Worked  3.4 7.2 8.8  9.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
  
  
Panel B: Last Worked- Age 25-34      
 1960 1970 1980  1990 
Whites    
This yr/Last yr 77.6 77.2 76.6  70.9 
2-5 yrs ago 9.5 10.1 9.3  13.0 
6+ yrs ago 6.4 5.0 7.4  8.7 
Never Worked  6.5 7.7 6.7  7.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
  
Blacks   
This yr/Last yr 68.3 66.0 56.2  53.9 
2-5 yrs ago 14.9 15.7 14.5  17.5 
6+ yrs ago 11.5 8.6 17.9  15.8 
Never Worked  5.3 9.7 11.4  12.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
 
Authors tabulations from the PUMS data. Starting in 1960 the Census asks respondents 
who were not working during the reference week for when they last worked. Responses 
have been standardized to permit comparability across years. No sample restrictions have 
been placed on the data except of omitting those currently in school.  
  
Table 4: Sensitivity of the Measured Racial Wage Gap to Sample-Selection Restrictions  
 
























Trim at 1980 1 
and 99 
percentiles 
Means        
1960  -0.550 -0.526 -0.551 -0.535 -0.545 -0.486 -0.504
1970  -0.450 -0.443 -0.457 -0.455 -0.448 -0.412 -0.450
1980  -0.356 -0.338 -0.353 -0.341 -0.343 -0.305 -0.318
1990  -0.353 -0.303 -0.321 -0.293 -0.314 -0.313 -0.347
      
Medians      
1960  -0.493 -0.456 -0.465 -0.479 -0.465 -0.454 -0.465
1970  -0.403 -0.390 -0.403 -0.403 -0.382 -0.379 -0.403
1980  -0.330 -0.293 -0.342 -0.305 -0.322 -0.328 -0.327
1990  -0.373 -0.308 -0.356 -0.266 -0.325 -0.332 -0.372
 
Weeks worked refer to weeks worked last year, and full-time hours are defined as 35 or more hours computed from “usual 
hours worked last year” in 1980-90 and hours worked last week in 1960-70. Samples are restricted to respondents who 
were not self-employed during the census reference week and who had valid wage observations from last year. Means 
report: E(ln wb) – E(ln ww) and medians report Med(ln wb) – Med(ln ww). Non-workers are excluded from the estimation 
sample, and wages for those currently in the armed forces are imputed using the details described in the Data Appendix. 
Bootstrapped standard-errors were always less than (0.010) for means and (0.015) for medians.  
  Table 5: Selectivity Corrected Estimates of the Racial Wage Gap 
 
  Observed Corrected 
             (1)       (2)      (3)            (4)         (5)          (6) 
  Mean Median Matching Median-O Median-NJ  Median 
Panel A: All States, all ages       
1960  -0.550 -0.509  -0.552 -0.510 -0.575 -0.566 
1970  -0.450 -0.423  -0.453 -0.426 -0.476 -0.465 
1980  -0.356 -0.342  -0.365 -0.351 -0.454 -0.422 
1990  -0.353 -0.350  -0.370 -0.368 -0.516 -0.456 
       
Panel B: All States, Excluding Incarcerated Sample  
1960  -0.549 -0.507  -0.550 -0.509 -0.555 -0.546 
1970  -0.448 -0.419  -0.450 -0.421 -0.465 -0.444 
1980  -0.351 -0.338  -0.359 -0.346 -0.428 -0.397 
1990  -0.337 -0.338  -0.350 -0.351 -0.453 -0.419 
    
Panel C: All States, Excluding Armed Forces Sample  
1960  -0.552 -0.507  -0.553 -0.509 -0.578 -0.570 
1970  -0.453 -0.424  -0.456 -0.427 -0.480 -0.471 
1980  -0.358 -0.335  -0.368 -0.345 -0.466 -0.436 
1990  -0.356 -0.350  -0.373 -0.368 -0.530 -0.474 
        
Panel D: Southern States    
1960  -0.654 -0.644  -0.652 -0.642 -0.690 -0.688 
1970  -0.551 -0.549  -0.550 -0.548 -0.578 -0.577 
1980  -0.405 -0.394  -0.410 -0.400 -0.482 -0.454 
1990  -0.393 -0.404  -0.404 -0.417 -0.523 -0.481 
 
Table reports difference of log offer-wages for blacks and whites. Observed mean and median are 
computed over the observed distribution of wages and covariates. Matching assigns all non-workers in 
each (year x race x age x education) cell the mean ln weekly wage, and Median-O assigns each 
nonworker the observed median. Median-NJ assigns all non-workers to below the pointwise median. 
Median assumes that only long-term nonworkers earn less than the cell median. See Section 2.1 of 
text for details. Bootstrapped standard-errors are always less than (0.010) for means and (0.012) for 
medians. 
  
Table 6: Observed and Estimated Hourly Offer Wages (in 1997 dollars)  
 
   Whites Blacks 
   <HS HS HS + Total <HS HS HS + Total
1980              
25-34  Observed Mean $10.3 $12.7 $13.8 $13.0 $8.7 $10.3 $11.7 $10.4
  Observed Median 11.3 13.5 14.9 14.1 9.2 11.3 13.0 11.4
  Corrected Median 10.9 13.8 15.0 14.2 7.7 11.0 13.1 10.8
   
35-44  Observed Mean 12.5 15.5 19.5 16.5 10.0 12.3 15.3 12.1
  Observed Median 13.8 16.6 20.5 17.4 10.6 13.9 16.8 13.5
  Corrected Median 13.1 16.7 20.7 17.4 9.5 13.1 17.0 12.2
   
45-54  Observed Mean 13.6 16.4 21.2 17.0 10.3 12.9 15.6 11.8
  Observed Median 15.0 17.9 21.9 17.9 11.5 14.8 17.7 13.4
  Corrected Median 13.6 17.2 21.9 17.6 8.8 13.5 16.8 11.4
   
Total   Observed Mean 12.3 14.4 16.6 14.9 9.6 11.3 13.2 11.2
  Observed Median 13.6 15.7 17.5 16.0 10.4 12.2 14.5 12.3
  Corrected Median 12.7 15.8 17.5 15.9 8.6 12.2 14.8 11.3
   
1990   
25-34  Observed Mean $9.0 $11.1 $13.5 $12.2 $7.1 $8.6 $10.9 $9.3
  Observed Median 9.6 11.7 14.2 12.9 7.3 9.0 11.2 9.9
  Corrected Median 8.8 11.7 14.7 13.1 4.9 8.3 11.7 9.1
   
35-44  Observed Mean 10.8 13.6 17.6 15.8 8.8 11.0 14.1 12.0
  Observed Median 11.5 14.4 18.5 16.9 8.9 11.8 15.6 12.9
  Corrected Median 10.0 14.2 18.6 16.4 6.8 10.7 15.4 11.7
   
45-54  Observed Mean 12.3 15.2 20.5 17.3 10.2 13.2 16.6 13.2
  Observed Median 13.3 16.2 21.9 18.7 10.8 14.4 17.8 14.3
  Corrected Median 11.1 15.9 21.2 17.6 8.1 12.4 17.1 12.0
   
Total   Observed Mean 10.5 12.8 16.4 14.5 8.6 10.1 12.9 10.9
  Observed Median 11.2 13.4 17.3 15.4 8.9 10.8 13.8 11.4
  Corrected Median 9.9 13.4 17.4 15.4 6.2 9.8 13.8 10.5
 
Hourly wages were computed by dividing weekly wages (observed or predicted) with the average number of 
hours worked in a week by workers in the relevant year x race x education x age cell. Self-employed workers are 
excluded from the analysis. Median assumes that long-term nonworkers earn less than the cell median. See 
Section 2.1 of text for details.  
  
Table 7: Estimates of the Residual Racial Wage Gap 
 
 
Panel A: All States  
 Observed  Corrected     Observed Corrected 
   Median-NJ Median      Median-NJ Median 
With Contemporaneous White Weights  With Contemporaneous Black Weights 
1960  -0.416 -0.458 -0.451 1960 -0.439 -0.499 -0.490
1970  -0.319 -0.347 -0.339 1970 -0.338 -0.384 -0.375
1980  -0.258 -0.322 -0.298 1980 -0.271 -0.360 -0.333
1990  -0.269 -0.360 -0.319 1990 -0.278 -0.407 -0.355
 
With Fixed 1975 White Weights      With Fixed 1975 Black Weights 
1960  -0.396 -0.422 -0.418 1960 -0.409 -0.452 -0.445
1970  -0.310 -0.332 -0.325 1970 -0.323 -0.359 -0.351
1980  -0.265 -0.338 -0.313 1980 -0.280 -0.379 -0.353




Panel B: Southern  States  
  Observed Corrected     Observed Corrected 
   Median-NJ Median        Median-NJ Median 
With Contemporaneous White Weights    With Contemporaneous Black Weights 
1960  -0.519 -0.553 -0.554 1960 -0.534 -0.570 -0.571
1970  -0.417 -0.438 -0.438 1970 -0.434 -0.449 -0.453
1980  -0.290 -0.346 -0.323 1980 -0.294 -0.358 -0.335
1990  -0.304 -0.371 -0.341 1990 -0.309 -0.391 -0.356
 
With Fixed 1975 White Weights      With Fixed 1975 Black Weights 
1960  -0.504 -0.535 -0.536 1960 -0.52 -0.555 -0.556
1970  -0.407 -0.43 -0.427 1970 -0.416 -0.434 -0.436
1980  -0.296 -0.353 -0.330 1980 -0.303 -0.368 -0.344
1990  -0.311 -0.386 -0.355 1990 -0.323 -0.412 -0.374
 
Table reports difference of log offer-wages for blacks and whites. All columns report estimates of the residual racial wage 
gap for both the observed and selection corrected data. Observed series refer to the observed pointwise median integrated 
over the skill distribution for workers. Median-NJ assigns all non-workers to below the pointwise median. Median assumes 
that only long-term nonworkers earn less than the cell median. See Section 2.1 of text for details. Bootstrapped standard-
errors are always less than (0.014).  
Table 8: Estimates of the Racial Wage Gap, by Birth Cohort  
 
Observed Median    Corrected-Median    Corrected with Concurrent White Weights 
Panel A: All States         
Birth Year  1960 1970 1980 1990   Birth  Year  1960 1970 1980 1990   Birth  Year  1960  1970 1980 1990 
1905  -0.526     1905 -0.642  1905 -0.535
1910  -0.547     1910 -0.617   1910 -0.524
1915  -0.517 - 0.508   1915 -0.575 -0.569   1915 -0.473 -0.419
1920  -0.522 -0.508   1920 -0.575 -0.534   1920 -0.446 -0.379
1925  -0.500 - 0.462 -0.388  1925 -0.556 -0.506 -0.546   1925 -0.432- 0.381- 0.376
1930  -0.469 - 0.433 - 0.379  1930 -0.481- 0.480 -0.496   1930 -0.363 -0.351- 0.351
1935  -0.452 -0.421 -0.420 - 0.341 1935 -0.520 -0.439 -0.495 - 0.492 1935 -0.410 -0.310 -0.357 -0.311 
1940   - 0.380 - 0.370 - 0.329 1940 -0.376 -0.446 - 0.455 1940 -0.249 -0.330 -0.320 
1945   - 0.297 - 0.321 -0.304 1945 -0.346 -0.378 - 0.434 1945 -0.243 -0.260 -0.289 
1950     - 0.283 - 0.340 1950 -0.337 - 0.442 1950 -0.248 -0.301 
1955     - 0.254 - 0.343 1955 -0.333 - 0.450 1955 -0.254 -0.342 
1960      - 0.370 1960 -0.494 1960 -0.387 
1965      - 0.294 1965 -0.388 1965 -0.275 
All Cohorts  -0.504  -0.427 -0.333 -0.335   All Cohorts  -0.561 -0.460 -0.415  -0.451   All Cohorts  -0.448 -0.330 -0.299 -0.325 
Within Cohort %    0.020  0.019 - 0.009 Within Cohort % 0.026 -0.033 - 0.051 Within Cohort % 0.0203 0.019 -0.009 
                         
Panel B: Southern States                     
Birth Year  1960 1970 1980 1990   Birth  Year  1960 1970 1980 1990   Birth  Year  1960  1970 1980 1990 
1905  -0.606     1905 -0.651  1905 -0.531
1910  -0.648     1910 -0.673   1910 -0.558
1915  -0.675 - 0.630   1915 -0.725 -0.683   1915 -0.612 -0.509
1920  -0.658 - 0.643   1920 -0.740 -0.613   1920 -0.593 -0.491
1925  -0.654 - 0.599 - 0.498  1925 -0.706 -0.639 -0.568   1925 -0.555 -0.495 -0.366
1930  -0.577 - 0.580 - 0.460  1930 -0.638 -0.631- 0.587   1930 -0.502- 0.475 -0.417
1935  -0.584 - 0.541 -0.494 - 0.439 1935 -0.646 -0.555 -0.545 - 0.516 1935 -0.526 -0.381- 0.390 -0.299 
1940   - 0.521 -0.451 -0.449 1940 -0.541- 0.505 - 0.550 1940 -0.380 -0.367 -0.376 
1945   - 0.371 -0.376 - 0.433 1945 -0.401- 0.425 - 0.498 1945 -0.310 -0.296 -0.333 
1950     - 0.297 - 0.43 1950 -0.325 - 0.507 1950 -0.238 -0.359 
1955     - 0.264 - 0.385 1955 -0.305 - 0.461 1955 -0.241- 0.348 
1960      - 0.367 1960 -0.473 1960 -0.374 
1965      - 0.261 1965 -0.394 1965 -0.303 
All Cohorts  -0.631  -0.550 -0.383 -0.388 All Cohorts  -0.687 -0.576 -0.441  -0.480   All Cohorts  -0.556 -0.430 -0.317 -0.347 
Within Cohort %   0.024  0.053  -0.052 Within Cohort % 0.051 0.022 -0.079 Within Cohort % 0.065 0.031 -0.039 
Table reports difference of log offer-wages for blacks and whites. Each birth cohort includes all persons born in the three-year interval centered on the reported birth year. Median 
assumes that long-term nonworkers earn less than the cell median. Within cohort percentage is the portion of the convergence in percentage points that can be explained using changes 





Table 9: Racial Difference in Participation: Evidence from Differences in Offer Wages 
 
 
       Black Offer Wage 
Decile   Simulated Racial Gap (W-B) in Offer  Wages   Observed Black Participation  Simulated White Participation 
  1960 1970 1980 1990    1960 1970 1980 1990  1960 1970 1980 1990 
1  -0.021 -0.061 -0.069 0.014    0.654  0.651 0.500 0.332  0.733 0.772 0.754 0.672 
2  0.004 0.001 0.007 0.013    0.592 0.636 0.472 0.448  0.708 0.726 0.660 0.659 
3  0.004 0.003 0.006 0.009    0.727 0.716 0.596 0.588  0.752 0.766 0.699 0.728 
4  0.003 0.010 0.006 0.003    0.719 0.767 0.663 0.607  0.754 0.805 0.718 0.712 
5  0.003 0.006 0.004 0.000    0.815 0.826 0.801 0.760  0.808 0.795 0.799 0.786 
6  0.007 0.003 0.003 0.005    0.876 0.888 0.817 0.807  0.799 0.866 0.829 0.842 
7  0.000 0.004 0.004 0.005    0.903 0.905 0.871 0.853  0.852 0.882 0.876 0.885 
8  0.009 0.004 0.004 0.002    0.911 0.912 0.875 0.873  0.875 0.929 0.905 0.907 
9  0.008 0.008 0.006 0.004    0.921 0.918 0.911 0.898  0.946 0.947 0.930 0.931 
10  0.054 0.050 0.033 0.054    0.877 0.879 0.874 0.892  0.954 0.947 0.940 0.953 
Total  0.007 0.003 0.000 0.011    0.799 0.808 0.736 0.706  0.903 0.905 0.872 0.874 
              
              
              
         1960 1970 1980 1990   
  1. Black Observed Participation Rate   0.799 0.808 0.736 0.706           
  2. White Observed Participation Rate   0.903 0.905 0.872 0.874           
  3. Difference     0.104  0.097  0.136  0.168        
                   
  4. White Simulated Participation Rate   0.818 0.843 0.811 0.808           
  5. Predicted Difference: (2)-(1)   0.085 0.061 0.061 0.067           
  6. Explained Component: (5)/(3)    82%  63%  45%  40%           
 
 
Offer wage distribution was computed with the Median estimator which assigns all long-term nonworkers to lie below the pointwise median respondent. Each non-worker 
was also assigned a random draw from a N(0,V) distribution whose variance was estimated pointwise. See text for precise details. Racial gap in offer wages is the difference of 
log offer-wages for blacks and whites. Computing white participation rates at relevant deciles of the black offer wage distribution generated simulated white participation. 
Predicted difference in the lower panel refers to that portion of the racial difference in participation that can be explained using differences in offer wages.  




  < than HS  HS HS+ Total < than HS HS HS+ Total
             
1960      
25-29  14,933 14,879 12,853 42,665 3,223 1,066 503 4,792
30-34  19,891 14,426 13,549 47,866 3,555 892 567 5,014
35-39  21,210 16,190 13,104 50,504 3,707 851 445 5,003
40-44  22,883 14,280 10,174 47,337 3,587 580 336 4,503
45-49  25,488 10,793 8,273 44,554 3,542 375 272 4,189
50-56  30,255 8,438 8,314 47,007 3,628 300 216 4,144
        
Total  134,660 79,006 66,267 279,933 21,242 4,064 2,339 27,645
        
1970      
25-29  11,175 20,708 20,117 52,000 2,604 2,215 1,021 5,840
30-34  11,608 17,520 15,302 44,430 2,597 1,657 694 4,948
35-39  13,457 15,617 14,557 43,631 2,890 1,306 710 4,906
40-44  17,985 14,885 14,107 46,977 3,237 1,048 581 4,866
45-49  19,204 15,726 13,226 48,156 3,439 907 430 4,776
50-56  24,493 16,602 11,944 53,039 3,828 664 381 4,873
        
Total  97,922 101,058 89,253 288,233 18,595 7,797 3,817 30,209
        
1980      
25-29  8,918 28,330 38,957 76,205 2,690 4,310 3,526 10,526
30-34  8,393 22,747 39,170 70,310 2,348 3,295 3,069 8,712
35-39  9,388 20,278 26,448 56,114 2,242 2,436 1,720 6,398
40-44  9,990 17,591 19,067 46,648 2,426 1,865 1,287 5,578
45-49  11,583 16,057 16,746 44,386 2,579 1,383 993 4,955
50-56  19,919 18,409 18,865 57,193 3,661 1,235 939 5,835
        
Total  68,191 123,412 159,253 350,856 15,946 14,524 11,534 42,004
        
1990      
25-29  7,751 28,090 39,081 74,922 1,748 4,436 3,579 9,763
30-34  7,563 29,134 43,977 80,674 1,716 4,082 3,970 9,768
35-39  6,195 23,457 46,601 76,253 1,632 3,324 3,680 8,636
40-44  6,216 19,435 43,366 69,017 1,552 2,564 3,040 7,156
45-49  7,518 18,154 30,202 55,874 1,622 1,858 1,772 5,252
50-56  10,080 19,145 25,218 54,443 2,075 1,805 1,480 5,360
        
Total  45,323 137,415 228,445 411,183 10,345 18,069 17,521 45,935
 
Authors tabulations from the PUMS data. No sample restrictions have been placed on the data. See Data Appendix for 




Appendix Table A2: Fraction of Prime Age Men without Skill Prices, and Fraction who are Long-Term Nonemployed 
 
Panel A: Fraction without Wage Observation From Last Year 
 
 
             Panel B: Fraction without Wage Observation From Last Year, currently 
not at work or school, and last worked three or more years ago 
 
  Whites Blacks  Whites  Blacks 
  < HS HS HS+ Total < HS HS HS+ Total < HS  HS HS+ Total < HS HS HS+ Total
       
1960        
25-34  0.069 0.033 0.039 0.049 0.134 0.093 0.084 0.120 0.035 0.011 0.006 0.019 0.084 0.054 0.030 0.072
35-44  0.076 0.040 0.042 0.057 0.130 0.095 0.055 0.119 0.044 0.015 0.011 0.027 0.089 0.055 0.033 0.079
45-54  0.109 0.071 0.076 0.095 0.156 0.105 0.094 0.148 0.065 0.032 0.028 0.052 0.110 0.067 0.056 0.104
         
Total  0.087 0.045 0.049 0.066 0.140 0.095 0.076 0.128 0.050 0.017 0.013 0.032 0.094 0.056 0.036 0.084
         
1970        
25-34  0.068 0.024 0.030 0.037 0.132 0.071 0.060 0.099 0.042 0.012 0.006 0.017 0.086 0.042 0.018 0.059
35-44  0.066 0.025 0.020 0.038 0.125 0.068 0.041 0.101 0.043 0.014 0.009 0.023 0.089 0.044 0.021 0.069
45-54  0.100 0.046 0.035 0.067 0.155 0.091 0.072 0.138 0.069 0.029 0.020 0.044 0.117 0.061 0.056 0.103
         
Total  0.082 0.031 0.028 0.048 0.139 0.074 0.056 0.112 0.054 0.018 0.011 0.028 0.099 0.047 0.027 0.076
         
1980        
25-34  0.131 0.043 0.036 0.050 0.281 0.146 0.104 0.167 0.083 0.019 0.009 0.021 0.189 0.082 0.039 0.096
35-44  0.128 0.047 0.029 0.055 0.214 0.135 0.091 0.155 0.083 0.025 0.012 0.031 0.150 0.087 0.047 0.102
45-54  0.179 0.085 0.060 0.107 0.288 0.174 0.126 0.232 0.131 0.057 0.034 0.073 0.218 0.119 0.081 0.170
         
Total  0.152 0.056 0.039 0.067 0.264 0.148 0.104 0.180 0.105 0.031 0.015 0.038 0.189 0.090 0.048 0.116
         
1990        
25-34  0.178 0.061 0.035 0.058 0.392 0.209 0.101 0.198 0.112 0.030 0.010 0.026 0.269 0.121 0.044 0.116
35-44  0.222 0.080 0.041 0.067 0.339 0.200 0.110 0.188 0.160 0.047 0.018 0.038 0.238 0.129 0.058 0.119
45-54  0.243 0.104 0.061 0.104 0.322 0.208 0.122 0.219 0.184 0.069 0.036 0.070 0.253 0.152 0.076 0.161
         
Total  0.214 0.078 0.043 0.073 0.352 0.206 0.108 0.199 0.151 0.045 0.019 0.041 0.254 0.130 0.055 0.127
         
Source: Authors tabulations from the PUMS data for 1960-1990  (1990 data have been weighted). Self-employed are excluded from the table.  
  
Appendix Table A3: Sensitivity of Weekly Wages to Sample Selection Criteria 
 
 
Panel A: Fraction with Wage Observation who worked 1-13 
Weeks Last Year 
 
                     Panel B: Difference of E(ln w|weeks>13) and E(ln w|all weeks)
 
 
  Whites Blacks  Whites  Blacks 
  < HS HS HS+ Total < HS HS HS+ Total < HS HS HS+ Total < HS HS HS+ Total
         
1960        
25-34  0.025 0.011 0.028 0.021 0.048 0.027 0.045 0.043 -0.010 -0.001 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.002 -0.014 -0.008
35-44  0.022 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.039 0.020 0.033 0.035 -0.009 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.001
45-54  0.026 0.012 0.010 0.020 0.044 0.024 0.031 0.041 -0.012 -0.002 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 -0.008 -0.020 -0.004
         
Total  0.024 0.010 0.017 0.018 0.043 0.024 0.038 0.040 -0.010 -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.008 -0.004
         
1970        
25-34  0.020 0.008 0.025 0.017 0.034 0.022 0.033 0.029 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.004 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.005
35-44  0.015 0.007 0.006 0.010 0.023 0.021 0.013 0.021 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.005
45-54  0.017 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.026 0.018 0.008 0.024 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.001
         
Total  0.017 0.008 0.015 0.013 0.027 0.021 0.021 0.025 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
         
1980        
25-34  0.037 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.059 0.042 0.037 0.045 -0.012 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 0.004 -0.010 -0.011 -0.007
35-44  0.026 0.012 0.010 0.014 0.032 0.026 0.023 0.027 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
45-54  0.020 0.014 0.010 0.015 0.022 0.018 0.022 0.021 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005
         
Total  0.026 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.037 0.033 0.031 0.034 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.007 -0.009 -0.005
         
1990        
25-34  0.054 0.024 0.020 0.024 0.084 0.064 0.045 0.060 -0.028 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 -0.032 -0.019 -0.023
35-44  0.037 0.021 0.013 0.017 0.060 0.039 0.028 0.038 -0.015 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.018 -0.019 -0.016
45-54  0.030 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.034 0.027 0.024 0.029 -0.013 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.015 -0.013 -0.012 -0.014
         
Total  0.040 0.021 0.016 0.020 0.060 0.049 0.035 0.046 -0.019 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 -0.024 -0.018 -0.019
         
 
Armed Forces sample has been excluded from the analysis.  Bootstrapped standard-errors based on 100 replications (within year cluster) were computed for each cell. 
In Panel B bold type indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level.  
 